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• • ?t><« ‘tT 















A BRIEF VIEW 


OF TKS 



POLICY AND RESOURCES 


OF THE 

UNITED STATES; 


COMPRISING 


SOME STRICTURES ON A LETTER 


ON THE 

GENIUS AND DISPOSITIONS OF THE FRENCH 
GOVERNMENT. 

\/ 

Omnis homines, qui de rebus dublis consultant, ab odio, 
amicitia,ira, atque misericordia vacuos esse decet. Haud facile 
animus verum providet, ubi ilia ofRciunt; neque quisquam om¬ 
nium lubidini simul, et usui paruit. Cjesar. 


PHILADELPHIA^^^ 
aqlnnskee 


Publislied by Bradford & Inskeep—aqfflnskeep & Bradfor<l, 
New York; William M‘Ilhenney, Boston; Edward J. Coale, 
Baltimore; Morford, Willington, and Co. Charleston. 






ERRATA, 


Page 26, note, line 3, for destinction, read distinction. 
32, line 20, for pretense, read pretence. 

37, 11, c/e/e theii*. 

44, 24, adandonment, read abandonment. 

46, 21, for in which, read with which. 

66, note, for D’Esprit, read De L’Esprit. 

85, line 25, dele the, 

88, 24, the laborious, read the most labo¬ 

rious. 


PREFACE. 

XHE present humiliated condition of the Unii 
ted States must be acknowledged and deplored 
by every American, td whatever party he may 
belong. . ’ ' '/'ft f 

Our ships plundered or 'burned-^by thd 
cruel mandates of the insatiate NdpoleoU;—- 
our commerce subjected to constraint or 
vexation—by the unnecessary and impolitick 
restrictions of England!—our honour tarnished 
by the most tame endurance of aggravated 
insult;—and our prbsperity arrested by the 
most abject submission to accumulated injury. 

Yet at a crisis so important, have we beheld 
the national legislature wasting its energies in 
idle controversy, abuse, or recrimination;' and 
after a session unusually protracted, passing to 
a state of adjournment, without devising a 
single project—much less enacting any mea¬ 
sures—cither for present or future relief.— 


IV 


However in theory the opposition may jus¬ 
tify their policy—practically they must admit 
their efforts to be unavailing—and the more ar¬ 
dently a desire to vindicate the honour and inte¬ 
rests of the country is professed by the ruling 
party, the more difficult is it to defend the 
conipetency of their system, when their profes¬ 
sions, and performances are compared. 

At a period such as I have described, when 
the unpopularity of the demeanour and doc¬ 
trines of one sect, has deprived them of the 
power to bring their principles into practice; 
and when the policy of another is found in 
practice inefficient, every effort to point out 
a course of political conduct, devoid of the un- 
pop^^larity attendant on the doctrines of the 
first, and free from the imbecility consequent 
to tf^;parsimonious systen> of the last, if not 
ip the execution meritorious, must at least in 
the design be deemed excusable. Anxious to 
accomplish this great object, I have ventured 
to offer to the publick this pamphlet. 

An .imperfect sketch of the views contained 
in iti was some time since published in a 
newspaper;! but the objects to which they are 


V 


directed being too important, and too intricate 
for that disconnected mode of publication, or 
for the desultory notice usually allotted to it, 
after very many additions and amendments, I 
again bring, them forward in a form more wor¬ 
thy, and more susceptible of attention. 

Time alone can determine the value of opi- 
nion 3 . Having written neither to flatter national 
vanity, nor to gratify party spirit, it is probable 
that in some, my work will excite indignation, 
and by others will be treated with coldness or 
neglect. In my own conviction, and reflections, 
however, 1 find at once my incitement, and my 
reward; conscious of no other incentives than 
ambition to serve my country, and a desire to 
merit approbation. That I am not instigated by 
any interested motives, will I trust be evident 
from the tenor of my sentiments:—for honours 
and emoluments—are vainly sought by those 
w’ho do not enlist under the banners of party. 

But wherefore should I employ my own 
sentiments, when I can avail myself of those of 
the celebrated Burke:— 

« It is an undertaking of some degree of delicacy 
to examine into the cause of publick disorders If a 


VI 


man happens not to succeed in such an inquiry, 
he will be thought weak and visionary; if he 
touches the true grievance, there is a danger that 
he may come near to persons of weight and conse¬ 
quence, who will rather be exasperated at the disco¬ 
very of their errours, than thankful for the occasion 
of correcting them. But in all exertions of duty 
something is to be hazarded. In cases of tumult and 
disorder, our law has invested every man, in some 
sort, with the authority, of a magistrate. When the 
affairs of the nation are distracted, private people are 
by the spirit of that law, justified in stepping a'little 
out of their ordinary sphere. They enjoy a privilege 
of somewhat more dignity and effect, than that of jdle 
lamentation over the calamities of their country. 
I'hey may look into them narrowly; they may reason 
upon them liberally; and if they should be so fortu¬ 
nate as to discover the true source of the mischief, 
and to suggest any probable method of removing it, 
though they may, displease the rulers of the dayi they 
are certainly of service to the cause of government.” 

I have nothing more to'acid, than what I 
trust will be sufficiently evident to those who 
peruse my book. I mean that I am an ardent 
admirer of the political system of the great 
Washington. 





CONTENTS. 


PAGE. 

-VIEWS of active partisans rarely correct in 
politicks, - - - - , 3 

Remarkable difference between man in his indi¬ 
vidual, and national character, - , - . 5 

Source of this difference, - , - - 6 

Consequences as evinced in national conduct, - 7 

Obvious deductions from these premises, - 9 

Instance of the neglect of such deductions in the 
author of the letter on the Genius and Disposi¬ 
tions of the French Government, - 10 

Bonaparte is not averse from commerce, - 11 

On that account more dangerous to the United 
States, - - - - -17 

Confidence in the permanency of the British . 
power, inconsistent with apprehensions of ; 
France, - - - , - - 20 

Policy of Great Britain absolutely narrow, but 
comparatively liberal, - - ^ 23 

Folly of contesting for rights, which we had not 
the power to csta.biish, - - - 27 

Wisdom of Washington, and ill consequences of 
deviating from the policy of this great man, ib. 
Contempt excited against us in Great Britain, 32 
G reat Britain not without a plausible pretension 
to the sovereignty of the ocean, - - ib. 

The territorial ambition of the French, not more 
rooted than the maritime ambition of the Bri¬ 
tish; but much more dangerous, and horrible 
in its nature, - - - - 34 

Propriety of guarding against both, - 35 

Consequences of the downfall of Great Britain, 37 
War with her at this time ip any issue, injurious, 
or ruinous, - - ^ - - 42 

I A navy our only means of eventual emancipa¬ 

tion from maritime vassalage, or of security 
from territorial subjugation, - - 45 

Washington’s objections to militia, - - 46 

Proofs that we have means to support a navy, 48 
Credit^ compared with gold and silver as a mean 
of commercial interchange, “ « “ 51 

Primitive operation of credit illustrated - 53 


via 


Wherein, among individuals it has a more bene¬ 
ficial operation tiian money, - - 55 

The only means of a general, and permanent 
diffusion of the command of capital, - 58 

Of alienated or paper credit, . . 62 

Wherein credit has in its national influence a 
more favourable operation than gold and silver 
money, - - - - - 66 

Virtually, constitutes a portion of commercial 
capital, - - - - - 67 

Emj>loyiTient of it advantageous to Great Britain, 
Neglect of it injurious to us, - - 71 

Answer to the objection founded on its liability 
to depreciation, in moments of alarm, - ib. 

Its superiority over gold and silver, in case of 
actual invasion, - - - - 72 

Basis of the current value of alienated credit, ib. 
National borrowings, are sales of national credit 
—which in the hands of individuals, answers 
one of the purposes of gold and silver money, 
and equally enriches the nation, - - 74 

An experimental proof of the validity of this po¬ 
sition - - - - - 7 6 

Advantages gained by alienating credit abroad, 77 
Alienation of the credit of banks, to be considered 
as a lease during the period of their existence, 79 
Publick debts are self paid, - - 81 

Poorer classes of society great gainers by national 
borrowings: as they can never be called upon 
to repay them, - - - - 83 

The sovereignty of the ocean a compensation to 
Great Britain for her great expenditure, - 84 

Advantageous consequences of the expenditure 
among the poorer classes of ten or twenty mil¬ 
lions,procured from rich citizens or foreigners, 87 
That the increase of production, caused by the 
increase of industry, arising from such expen¬ 
diture, would in a great degree compensate 
for the expense of a navy, - . _ 89 

.Means of the United States quadrupled, while 
prosperous, in a little more than twenty years, 90 
Efficiency of a navy increased by their situation, 91 
Jefierson and the majority of his partisans, really 
fearful, of war with England, - - 92 

.Desultory Observations. 


A BRIEF VIEW 


OF THE 

POLICY AND RESOURCES 


OF THE 

UNITED STATES, &c. 

IT is a natural, and of course a general 
opinion, that correct political conceptions are 
most frequently found among those, who are 
actively engaged in the field of politicks.— 
Among active politicians we shall undoubtedly 
find the most accurate knowledge of political 
detail, and the most correct views of legislative 
practice, in cases not calculated to excite—the 
emotions of anger—or the spirit of party. But 
such men are in general so much biassed by 
these impulses, that of the great fabrick of 
national policy, they rarely take those impartial 
views, which arise from the contemplation of 
the principles of human nature, as developed 
by the conduct of nations since the beginning 
of the world. The consideration of these prin¬ 
ciples, will in many cases enable us to form a 
more accurate estimate of the probable rela» 


4 


fions between different countries, as respects 
peace or war, than we can possibly acquire, 
by that hourly reckoning, or those partial and 
confined observations, which in the sea of po¬ 
litical controversy, so often give to talents an 
erroneous course. 

That such are the ill effects of political strife, 
is evident from the extremes of preference or 
dislike to different constitutional modifications, 
which are always displayed in republicks— 
and also by the friendship or antipathy, in¬ 
dulged towards different nations, by oppo¬ 
site parties. We have only to revert to the 
pages of history, to be convinced of the equally 
absurd excesses of opponent politicians, and 
how often the truth has been found—-not in the 
favourite system of either party, but in a 
course which would have been dictated by 
principles inseparable from the nature of man. 

The more a nation prospers—the more the 
wisdefm of her interiour legislation, or the ener¬ 
gy of her measures externally, excite our ad¬ 
miration and respect—the more is she to be 
feared. To the same love of power, or love of 
wealth to which she owes her greatness—-will 


5 

other nations owe their fall. It was by such 
views, that the venerable Cato was led to 
exhibit in the Roman senate the rich fruit of 
Carthage, and exclaim delenda est Carthago,^ 
A conclusion founded in a policy more cruel 
than false, and universally exercised by nations 
when they have the requisite power—how¬ 
ever in the abstract they may detest it—or when 
they arc themselves the victims. For ambition 
and avarice are plants existing in every soil, 
and ever prepared, by a noxious and active lux- 
uriancy—to overspread and blast the less vi¬ 
gorous foliage of humanity and justice. 

Individually, men differ from each other 
more than individuals among inferiour animals; 
but in the aggregate, as respects the more pow¬ 
erful passions—they are not more dissimilar, 
nor less cruel—than the most savage of the brute 
creation. It is a universal observation of those, 
whose interests have been placed in opposition 
to companies, or large bodies of men, that these 
are very little actuated by generous passions. 
This trait becomes the more strong, as the 
number concerned increases. Hence, among 
* We must destroy Carthage. 


6 


nations, no other limits are assigned to cruelty 
or oppression, than those which result from the 
absence or termination of power. Republicks 
have always been more systematically oppres¬ 
sive to their conquered provinces, than mo- 
narchs; and were the question of clemency or 
plunder left to the populace or common sol- 
diery—who would expect the milder alterna¬ 
tive ? 

Yet among scenes of the greatest national 
cruelty—instances of individual benevolence, 
will often form a striking contrast, with the 
general gloom. 

A little attention to the ruling principles of 
our nature, will soon explain this diversity of 
man—in his individual—and national charac¬ 
ter. It will l:)e found, that those springs of the 
human heart, which excite us to act towards 
each other with' justice, compassion, gene¬ 
rosity or benevolence, are capable only of a 
limited operation. We sympathize most 
strongly with our nearest relations, or most 
intimate friends, less with our associates, or 
dependents; and in a diminishing gradation, 
with our townsmen—our countrymen—and 


mankind at large. But as every influence 
which emanates from a centre however in¬ 
tense in its operation on the nearest objects, 
becomes insignificant as respects the most re¬ 
mote; so the sentiments of the soul however ar¬ 
dent in respect to kindred or friends, are depri¬ 
ved of their vigour when the objects are multi, 
tudinous, or far distant. The glorious sun, which 
beams so intensely on Mercury—sheds but a 
feeble light on the Georgian star—and, in the 
remoter regions of space—faintly twinkles, or 
becomes invisible.—When we behold the tor¬ 
tures of animals the most inferiour—we feel 
more—than when w^e hear of the slaughter of 
thousands of our species—remote from our 
personal observation. 

Philanthropy is much more often assumed as 
an ornament, than excited by feeling. Religion 
and morality may lead us to deprecate the 
horrours which arise from national strife, but 
the recital of them, when we are not the imme¬ 
diate sufferers—rarely interferes with 'our 
slumbers—or interrupts the festivity of a meal. 

The greatest national right—the right 
of conquest—is the greatest moral wrong,— 


8 


Yet is this the boasted foundation of nation¬ 
al sovereignty throughout the globe. Few 
countries are inhabited by the descendants of 
their original—and of course of their rightful 
possessors. The country we possess—was ob¬ 
tained by force or artifice; and Europeans glory 
in their descent from those military leaders, 
whose occupation in its true colours—was 
murder and robbery. History does not furnish 
an instance of a nation, which has hesitated to 
seize an advantage—when encouraged by 
power—and invited by weakness—however 
destructive the consequences to the happiness 
of an injured nation—or inconsistent with the 
principles of justice or humanity. The fear 
of the retaliation of barbarity, has melio¬ 
rated the conduct of modern Europe; and 
injury now ceases, with the attainment of the 
views which excite it. Hence wanton aggres¬ 
sions at present rarely occur; but in return, as 
national interest is much better understood, and 
as ambition and avarice are more systcmatick 
in their plans—if they are less often guilty of 
wanton oppression—they omit it more rarely, 
hen it is pregnant with advantage. 


9 


Even the tameness of the policy of Jefferson, 
does not exempt America from the general 
opprobrium. Her embargo was intended to 
excite misery or famine—among innocent 
slaves or manufacturers, as the means of 
coercing their rulers into the abandonment of a 
system injurious to her interests—rulers, who, 
by the projectors of that measure—were deem¬ 
ed inaccessible to the pleadings of compassion. 

From the principles of national conduct 
which are thus undeniably prevalent, it ap¬ 
pears obvious, that in determining the pro¬ 
bable hostility—or good will, which may arise 
between different nations—or how far the power 
of one—-is to be apprehended by another; all 
calculations founded on national virtue are to 
be deemed inadmissible. The question should 
be simply—how far will any opposition arise 
between the prevailing national passions, of 
avarice or ambition—how far are they direct¬ 
ed to the same objects—and what may be the 
ability of either nation to destroy or impede, the 
fairness or freedom of that rivalship, which 
must ensue in a competition for the same 
means of wealth or power? 

c 


10 


The author of a late Letter on the Genius 
and Dispositions of the French government, ap¬ 
pears to have omitted to apply this investigation, 
to the situation of his country—in all its rela¬ 
tions; and the picture he has drawn with such 
masterly address, is only suited to that partial 
prospect, which naturally attracted his attention 
when surrounded by those who could sympa¬ 
thize in no other. He has indeed skilfully, and 
no doubt justly portrayed, the nefarious princi¬ 
ples—the cruel practices—and the tremendous 
power of France. But he has not recollected, 
that her principles, and her practice, have only 
been the natural consequences of her power; and 
not of any vice, peculiarly inherent in French¬ 
men. Instances of a policy no less nefarious, are 
to be found in the annals of many nations, 
though the practiail consequences have rarely 
been so hurtful to the happiness of mankind.^ 
Consistently with the views which I have 
advanced it must necessarily follow, that such 
a power as that wielded by France, will occasion 
every imaginable evil to those who may fall 
within its sweep. The anxiety inspired by it, as 
regarding our owm interests—can only be 
* See note—page 40. 


11 


mitigated in proportion, as we are removed 
from the sphere of its activity. Far be it from 
me to alleviate this anxiety—or to blame the 
author for his efforts to excite it. It is the 
partial tendency of his efforts that I inculpate. 
I blame him—that while intent upon exhibiting 
the baleful influence of the power of one coun¬ 
try, he almost wholly disregards the actual con¬ 
sequences of the power of another—or seems 
to hail it as a benignant sunshine—calculated, 
under the guidance of wisdom and virtue— 
to cherish and enliven us in our progress to 
prosperity. 


Among other opinions advanced by this au-» 
thor—the following is most prominent for sin¬ 
gularity:—That Napoleon is not adverse to 
commerce as supporting England—but that he 
is adverse to England as supporting commerce. 
I shall endeavour to expose the fallacy of this 
opinion, not merely from the love of truth; but 
because I conceive it to involve in obscurity 
the great avenue of danger from the French 
government. 


12 


The ensuing quotations from the letter it¬ 
self, will better enable the reader to understand 
my objections: — 

These considerations,” says the author, 
are urged principally with a view to elu- 
cidate a topick of the highest importance 
“ to this country, I mean the determined 
“ hostility of Bonaparte to commerce under 
“ any shapes He is, both from policy and 
temper, an enemy to the whole modern sys- 
“ tern of publick economy, of which trade is 
the leading feature.” p. 209 and 210. 

“ The British are detested by Bonaparte, not 
-merely as political enemies, but asa commer- 
cial people. Under the pretence of contend- 
ing for the liberty of the seas—he aims his 
blows at the spirit of commerce, and at the 
admirable constitution which it strengthens 
and defends. In waging war against the com- 
merce of England, it is not merely her de- 
“ struction that he meditates. He is almost as 
“ forcibly impelled by his desire to extinguish 
“ the whole trading economy of the world, 
which, without England, the spring and soul 
of the system, must soon disappear.’’ p. 213 


13 


“ The French rulers are characteristically, 
and systematically enemies to commerce in 
any form,” p. 242. 

Every individual is incessantly incited by 
pride—to exalt the occupation which he pur¬ 
sues—and to depress and vilify those which 
are pursued by others. 

Hence arises a contention for preeminence, 
which is not susceptible of settlement, without 
some extraneous coercion. In the eye of the 
sage, no pursuit is more despicable than that 
of the soldier, when not consecrated to the de¬ 
fence of the rights of human nature. But though 
much more often engaged in the violation—than 
the support of these rights, he has unduly forced 
his profession into the primary rank, through 
the aid of that power, which is the concomitant 
of military success; and humbling all other pro¬ 
fessions into apparent submission, he is enabled 
to give full scope to his vanity or pride.— 
Such no doubt, is the foundation of that 
contempt, which the military have shown in 
every age, for all other occupations than that 
of arms. The influence of superstition—or 


14 


the wonders of science, may have gained fo, 
religion and philosophy some respect, but the 
ordinary paths of pecuniary emolument— 
have ever been despised.—We ought then 
to expect in Napoleon—that contempt for 
commerce, which has at all times pervaded 
his profession. We should however distinguish 
contempt from hatred; and I shall endeavour to 
show that the author whom I have cited, has 
erroneously imagined the existence of the latter 
sentiment, in the mind of this great conqueror 
as respects Commerce—unless so far as it may 
be associated with the detested prosperity of 
that nation—by whom his power is defied—and 
controlled. 

It is true that commerce and despotism can 
but ill subsist together;—but it is in the same 
way as the entertainment of the hedge-hog, was 
incompatible with the comfort of the snakes. 
The injury—the fear—and dislike, are not felt on 
the side of the despot—but on that of commerce. 
Despotism has often destroyed commerce, be¬ 
cause attended by an arbitrary and versatile 
policy, altogether inconsistent with those indus¬ 
trious pursuits tvhich require permanency of 


15 


duration, for the repayment of capital invested* 
But commerce never has—nor ever can subvert 
despotism; because, under circumstances so 
hostile to its prosperity—it can never make 
progress sufficient, to weigh against sovereign 
power. 

As a source of wealth, it cannot excite appre¬ 
hension, for it may be doubted whether more 
servility would not be found in the rich 
merchant—than in the poor farmer. This ob¬ 
servation is justified by the late contest in Spain, 
where the wealthy families, fearing the loss of 
their enjoyments, have been less bold in their 
opposition than the peasantry; and it is not 
improbable, that the greatest difficulties of 
Napoleon, may eventually arise from popular 
rebellion. 

Commerce was undoubtedly instrumental in 
the overthrow of the feudal system, but in this it 
rather aided—than opposed monarchical power. 
Seeking privileges and protection from the 
sovereign against the oppression of the nobles, 
the commercial towns in return, afforded him 
the means of preponderance over those turbu¬ 
lent^ vassals; but this was an operation, very 


16 


different from that which would justify the ide^i 
of its competency—to subvert despotick power. 

The mercantile class are powerful, only as 
furnishing indirectly the sinews of power—but 
in any direct agency are actually helpless. 
The sway of Bonaparte, has been established 
in opposition to all the commercial influence of 
Europe in the height of its vigour.—If too 
imbecile to preserve its standing,—how can it 
have strength to regain it? If in prosperity im¬ 
potent—how can it in adversity be formidable, 
—and more especially in that degree which 
would be requisite to excite—the fear—and 
hatred—of its stern destroyer—unless when as¬ 
sociated with the power of Britain ? 

As a mean of wealth—it must be desirable 
to France, in common with all other means 
of attaining power and magnificence. Those 
who love plunder—must love wealth. If there 
be an alternative—few despots are so insane, 
as not to prefer milder means of attaining it, 
than those of devastation and robbery. The 
politick rulers of France, are not ignorant of 
the depopulation and imbecility consequent 
to these, however extensive the empire, over 


17 


which they may be exerted. They have before 
them the example of Turkey, which though 
extending over a portion of the globe once 
pre-eminent in wealth and population, is now 
in resources inferiour to the island of Great 
Britain. 

So far then as the encouragement of com¬ 
merce is not incompatible with the measures 
essential to the support of his military ope¬ 
rations, or the means which he deems requisite 
to enfeeble his enemy, it is incorrect to suppose 
Napoleon averse from this branch of industry, 
or that he would not afford it encouragement. 
But in this would arise our danger, should the 
power of England cease. It is by alluring com¬ 
merce only, that he could become dangerous to 
us; and our principal hope must be founded on 
the idea, that she will be unsuccessfully court¬ 
ed‘fey him or his successors while arrayed in 
the obnoxious insignia of despotism. In this 
respect, the views of the author of the letter, 
seem the opposite of mine. He appears to sup¬ 
pose that the aversion of the emperour from 
commerce, renders him inimical to our com¬ 
mercial prosperity; while I am of opinion that 


18 


vne more he drives her from his dominions, 
the more will she confine herself to other 
countries, where she may meet a more gracious 
reception. She does not require multifarious 
emporiums—when driven from one—she soon 
creates another. We should be jealous of her 
admirers—not of her enemies. By the display 
of a more commodious path, Portugal seduced 
her from Venice.—Alarmed by the despotism 
of Philip II. and enticed by the assiduity of 
the Hollanders, she first sought refuge among 
those gallant republicans—and then extended 
her favours to England. Finally, scared by 
the “ glare of the baleful sceptre,”—by 
the universality of continental warfare; and 
partially captivated by the insular situation of 
Great Britain, and her maritime power; or 
allured by the remoteness of America, and 
the advantage of neutrality; she has divided her 
munificence—between this country—and that. 
But we have defended her with so little gallan¬ 
try, that she now hesitates between our remote¬ 
ness from the scene of war—and the superiour 
disposition and capacity of the British, to guard 
her from hostility. 


19 


The author is certainly incorrect in found¬ 
ing his fears of France, on her enmity to 
commerce. If by genius and disposition hostile 
to this great and essential source of maritime 
power; how can she command that element 
—by which alone we are accessible to injury, 
—or open to rivalship ? The author and my¬ 
self coincide in some degree, as to tlie in¬ 
congruity of the French government, with 
the growth of commerce: we differ as to 
the disposition of that government to cherish it. 
This disposition will I believe, be very great; 
and notwithstanding all difficulties, it is pro¬ 
bable that in the event of the destruction 
of the British power, the navy of France, 
—might become sufficient for the annihilation 
our commerce,—and interruption of our do- 
mestick repose. 

To conclude, though I represent our causes 
for apprehension—differently from this author, 
and, as I imagine—more correctly—nothing 
is more remote from my intention than to 
diminish the sense of danger. My desire is, to 
hold up to my countrymen, that impartial view 
of our foreign relations; which can alone incite 


20 


them to pursue the course, which I conceive 
to be indispensable to their honour, and pro¬ 
sperity. 

Let us proceed farther to examine the opi¬ 
nions of this eloquent writer: 

“ Whatever” he observes, “ may be the fate 
‘‘ of the continent, the British cannot fall. The 
“ character of the population of England, the 
“abundance of her pecuniary resources—and 
“ eminently her navy—the great buttress of her 
“ strength—preclude almost the possibility oj 
“ her overthrow .”—Letier on the Genius and 
Disposition of the Freiich Government, p. 243, 
244 .^ 

So long as the British navy is predominant, 
no one can imagine, that the power of the 

• This opinion is in a degree similar in its tenour, 
and is the same in tendency, as that expressed to 
Philip II. by Idiaquez, one of his principal officers of 
state:-—The situation of England,” said that prudent 
statesman, “ which is surrounded on every side with 
“ a tempestuous ocean, and has few harbours upon 

its coasts;—^the numerous forces which defend it—- 
“ the genius of the people, and the nature of their 


21 


French emperour can become dangerous to the 
liberties of this country. The author, demon¬ 
strates the permanency of the British power;— 
how is this reconcileable with his fears of subju¬ 
gation to France—and more especially as he 
represents the internal resources of this country 
as strained to a point inconsistent with their 
continuance, while its supplies—from external 
devastation and robbery, constitute a resource 
necessarily destructive of itself? 

This leads to a consideration which places in 
the strongest light, that bias or inconsistency 
of opinion which results from partiality or 
aversion in respect to foreign nations. While 
our security from the oppression of either of 
the great belligerents, is in any considera¬ 
ble degree dependent on a due balance of 
their power; it is manifest that a diminution of 

‘‘ government, concur in making me believe, that it 
“ will be found almost impossible to succeed in an 
“ attempt to conquer it.—The English navy is alone 
« equal to that of any other nation; and when joined 
“with the ships belonging to the revolted provinces, 
“ must prove an overmatch for any fleet that can be 

“sent from Spain.” \_Watson^s Philifi II.]-It is 

hardly necessary to remark, how fully these observa¬ 
tions were justified, by the fate of the A "mada. 


22 


tlie weight in one scale, must have the same 
effect as an increase of weight in the other, 
—since in either case, a preponderancy must 
ensue, injurious to our interest. It would be 
natural therefore, that those who would ex¬ 
cite our fears—of the power of one country, 
should ground their arguments—on the com¬ 
parative weakness of the other;—but this is 
the contrary of the course ordinarily pursued. 
Those who are most apprehensive of Bri¬ 
tain—generally represent her as sinking under 
an accumulating load of debt and taxation; 
while those who would alarm us against 
France, are the most ready to depreciate— 
the solidify or permanency of her resources. 

A magnanimous American would scorn to 
be dependent for the liberties of his country, 
on the duration of this balance of foreign 
power; but reviewing our present means of 
resistance, compared with the force which 
we should be necessitated to oppose, there is 
no room for tliis noble independency of senti¬ 
ment, and he is forced, by the prospect of 
irresistible evil, to tolerate a predicament so 
monstrous, as that of being indebted for safet_y 


23 


to those—who are our permanent rivals in 
commerce,—and consequently our enemies 
upon the principles of national conduct already 
laid down. 

Could Great Britain and America, be di¬ 
vested of those partial views of right, or inte¬ 
rest, which are almost inseparable from human 
nature;—their mutual welfare—-and even gran¬ 
deur, would be far from incompatible. The 
ocean and the land are not so confined in ex¬ 
tent, as not to afford ample room for the great¬ 
est luxuriance in the prosperity of both 
countries. Eat by past experience we are 
taught, that it is in vain to hope that two nations 
travelling on the same route to wealth, will 
ever proceed harmoniously; or find any other 
mean of determining their respective claims, 
than that of power. 

In respect to Great Britain however it 
must be admitted, that although from justice 
or humanity she rarely abandons the course 
dictated by interest; yet in pursuing it, 
owing to the excellent form of her govern¬ 
ment and spirit of her laws, she has generally 
displayed more liberality than other nations. 
In the abstract, her policy may often be found 


24 


too narrow, as it was in her treatment of this 
country while under her sway; but her conduct 
even in thisrespect was liberal, when compared 
with the colonial policy of France, Spain, 
Portugal, or Holland. 

Had her system at an early period, been as 
contracted as that pursued by these nations, we 
should never have had—the spirit—the liberty, 
—the wealth—or the power—to which we 
owe our glorious independence. It was only 
through this superiour liberality or wisdom in 
construing her interest, that she ever per¬ 
mitted the extension of our commerce: for 
had she yielded to that jealousy and cupidity 
which it was so much calculated to excite— 
she would, at an early period, have depressed 
—or destroyed it. 

But yet much apprehension must arise in 
the bosom of an American, when he compares 
the vast and durable maritime force of Great 
Britain, with our capacity to afford it that coun¬ 
terpoise, which can alone relieve us from this 
degrading dependency, on the liberal exercise 
of her uncontrolled power. Had the author to 
whom I have referred, comprised in his picture 


25 


this insurmountable impediment to our com¬ 
mercial progress, which lies so directly in our 
path—as well as that more malignant—but 
more distant evil which can only operate when 
the immediate obstacle shall cease; the great 
outline of his painting being rendered complete 

amid the brilliancy of colouring displayed 
throughout, it would have been impossible not 
to have overlooked every minor errour or in¬ 
consistency. He should have allowed a portion 
of his canvas to be occupied with the display 
—of that tremendous maritime power—w hich 
though created by necessity—and by the no¬ 
blest incitements—yet being created—has 
placed his country in a state of commercial vas¬ 
salage, productive of evils—great—immediate 
—and permanent,* 

* While differing in my views bf national policy 
from this pleasing writer, I cannot avoid an oppor¬ 
tunity of expressing my personal regard for him; and 
how highly I prize his talents, acquirements, and 
social virtues. 

When we consider that in jurisprudence, in sci¬ 
ence, in arts, and arms, collectively, Great Britain 
has never been equalled by any nation in the present, 
or in past ages; and that, by the course of events, it 
has become her interest to defend the rights of those 

R 


26 


But while disposed to view the power of 
Britain, with sentiments so different from this 
author;—no one can more bitterly deplore, 
-that ignorance and folly, which has brought 
us into premature collision with this commer¬ 
cial colossus. No one can more regret, that in¬ 
stead of that silent and euergetick course, which 
is indispensable to the creation of power in the 
presence of a jealous and overpowerful rival, 
we should have abandoned great and essential 

nations, which France is, by ambition and avarice, 
prompted to invade; it is not surprising that a juve¬ 
nile mind, recently warmed by hospitality anddestinc- 
tion, should be inspired by an enthusiastick admiration 
uf a nation, whose conduct under this partial view, 
may appear as preeminent in virtue, as in greatness: 
or that, by a mind so situated, inferences in respect 
to the general or permanent conduct of the two great 
nations, should be drawn from their partial and tem¬ 
porary conduct, as it was most forcibly presented to 
his more immediate remark, and predominant sen¬ 
sations. I have been the less reluctant in combating 
his political views, because I am conscious, that 
whatever may be the fate of these, it will be impossi¬ 
ble ever to depreciate the ability and information, 
which he has displayed in preparing them for the 
publick eye. The genius of his country is honoured 
by his style—^which is formed' by that irresistible 
union of eloquence and energy—which fascinates by 
its beauty—or overpowers by its force. 


J 


27 


advantages—that we might resent insults, we 
could not punish—or contend for theoretick 
rights—we had not the means to establish. 
How different was the conduct of that tutelary 
genius, whose wisdom and virtue are rendered 
if possible more conspicuous, by the terrible 
evils which have ensued from the policy of those, 
who dared to impeach the purity, or correctness, 
of his motives or measures ? Never was a com¬ 
parison more fairly made in practice between 
opposite political systems, than we have seen 
in the trial of the policy of Washington, and 
that of Jefferson and his successor. The great 
founder of American independence, saw the im¬ 
possibility of a successful struggle for those 
commercial privileges—which America might 
in theory claim—but in practice could not esta¬ 
blish—till time should afford her maritime 
strength. He saw the necessity of our rising 
under the wings of that very power—whose 
jealousy by our rivalship—we were destined 
sooner or later to excite. He saw that as yet in 
our political infancy—to contend for all our com¬ 
mercial rights—would cause the loss of every 
commercial advantage; and that early demon- 


28 


strations of hostility, by alarming the fears of 
Great Britain, might give rise to a premature 
contest, and terminate not only the advantages 
we enjoyed from neutrality but our rights as a 
commercial nation. In our imbecile state, he saw 
war could neither punish insult—nor retaliate 
injury: but would lead to a deprivation of that 
access to the ocean—which is essential to our 
wealth or glory. He was convinced of the 
folly of that boasted warfare of commercial re¬ 
strictions which was proposed during his pre¬ 
sidency by Madison, and which when since 
tried in practice—has proved more injurious 
to ourselves, than to our enemies. He knew that 
as commercial intercourse could never have 
arisen without mutual advantage—it could not 
be interrupted without reciprocal injury. 

Every friend of America, who contemplates 
her permanent interest with a dispassionate 
eye, must lament, that in opposition to the 
precepts and practice of this illustrious chief, 
we should have embarked in that premature 
contention, which he so studiously avoided; 
but it is to be recollected, that the folly and 
passion in which it has arisen, are the insepa- 


29 


rable concomitants of popular government, 
founded on the suffrages of the multitude who 
though honest, are ignorant—whose impres¬ 
sions are excited by feeling, not created by 
thought: and least of all by that peculiar depth 
of reasoning, or elevation of view, w hich is in¬ 
dispensable to the attainment of political truth. 
In such governments, we often behold the pas¬ 
sions which give rise to the keenest resentment, 
but rarely find the wisdom or moderation w hich 
is requisite for the discovery, or pursuit, of the 
only means which can lead to redress. But 
while the genuine patriot deplores these evils 
resulting from an excess of that democracy, 
which under due modification is the best 
foundation of government; it is not the less his 
duty to pursue the only course, which tends to¬ 
wards melioration, or cure. And since Great 
Britain has by popular violence, been urged 
into a state of hostility; and as there is little 
probability that this disposition in her, or the 
antipathy of the American populace by which 
it has been excited, w ill permit us to hope for 
lasting amity, we have little reason to congratu¬ 
late ourselves in the contemplation of that 


30 


greatness, which is thus brought into oppo¬ 
sition with our interests—however uselessly or 
prematurely. 


But to return to the author:— 

“ The idea of unlimited sway is studiously 
kept before the publick mind—and the future 
“ empire of France over the nations of the earth 
“ exultingly proclaimed, in all the songs of the 
“ theatres and in publick discourses of every 
“ description. Even the gaunt and ragged 
“ beings, who prowl about the streets and infest 
“ the night cellars of Paris—the famished out- 
“ casts—many of whom are men of decent 
exteriour and advanced age, beggared by the 
“ revolution—who haunt the Boulevards, and 
“ publick gardens, in order to enjoy, under the 
“ rays of the sun, that enlivening warmth 
“ which their poverty denies them at home— 
“ and who by their wan and melancholy aspect 
“ excite the horrour and compassion of a 
“ stranger—all appear to forget for a moment, 
“ their own miseries, in anticipating the brilliant 
“ destinies of the empire, and contemplating 


31 


Paris in prospective as the metropolis of the 
“ world. The inhabitants of the country and of 
“ the provincial cities—whose condition the 
“ war renders miserable beyond description, 
“ and who secretly invoke the bitterest curses 
“ on tlieir rulers—are nevertheless (for such 
“ is the character of this extraordinary people) 
‘‘ not without their share in the general avidity 
“ for power; and when the sense of their wretch- 
“ edness does not press too strongly upon them, 
“ can even consent to view the extension of the 
“ national influence and renown in the light of 
“ a personal benefit .’’—Letter on the genious 
and dispositions of the French goi^ernment. p, 
25, 26. 

It is well known that at the outset of those 
wars, which have since devastated Europe, 
Great Britain displayed a very serious hostility 
to our commerce, though her acts of violence, 
were subsequently surpassed by France. By 
the policy of Washington however, she was 
led to associate our prosperity with her own, 
and generally restrained the exercise of her 
power, fearing the reflected operation on her 


32 


own means of wealth. But there are reasons for 
believing, that the necessity or value of our in¬ 
tercourse with her—and more especially of our 
power to impede it—was very much overrated 
by the politicians of that country, as well as of 
this. At all events, such are the impressions of 
that nation at this time. We have displayed our 
animosity—exposed our commercial insignili- 
cance,—and exhausted our means of retaliation: 
we have demonstrated at once—our hostilty— 
and our impotence. It is not surprising there¬ 
fore, that all who return from that country, 
should bear witness that a most determined 
spirit of contempt pervades that nation—as re¬ 
spects this, and that their views, in regard to 
our future commercial freedom—are oppres¬ 
sive and degrading. The sovereignty of the 
ocean, they appear to estimate as theirs, by the 
right of conquest—and not without a very plau¬ 
sible pretense. The right of conquest as relating 
to the land, has no other basis than the impos¬ 
sibility of overthrowing it. According to the 
universal practice of nations—every people 
have a right to whatever they can seize, or 
defend; and have no right to that—which they 
do not—or cannot defend. 


33 


It requires no great depth of penetration to 
discover, that this is the basis of the right over 
a conquered country. If no nation has ever yet 
claimed an ocean on this principle—it is only 
because the power has been wanting to sup¬ 
port the claim. Is not Great Britain quite as 
justifiable in using the ocean for her purposes 
—as we are for employing our immense ter¬ 
ritory for ours ? We have had no other 
justification for taking it from the aborigines, 
than that they were too weak—too ignorant— 
or too unwise to defend it: and have not the 
British all these apologies for depriving us of 
the ocean ? For although there be wisdom— 
knowledge—and strength in our country, ade¬ 
quate to justify a very different character—have 
we not to lament the total absence of these 
qualifications—in the actual conduct of the na¬ 
tion ! ? 

In the passage above quoted, from the letter 
on the genius and dispositions of the French 
government; there is a very lively—and no 
doubt very just picture of the ambitious fury 
which now possesses the people of France. 

F 


34 


The author is certainly to be commended 
for opening to his countrymen a view, which 
should make them shudder when they reflect 
that for security from the ill-consequences of this 
mania, they are indebted to a foreign nation. 
But would not his merit have been much great¬ 
er, had he demonstrated that a spirit of domina¬ 
tion was no less prevalent in England as respects 
the ocean, than in France as respects the land. 
While so attentive to the songs of the latter— 
does he forget the spirit exhibited in the songs 
of the former? Has he never heard the sky re¬ 
sounding with the cry of Rule Britannia, 
Britannia rule the waves ?”—Flattering sounds 
to a British ear—but for the same reason hu¬ 
miliating, to those of an American. 

Many of the songs of this gallant people, dis¬ 
play a similar thirst for maritime power. That 
the ambition of the French is of a more malig¬ 
nant cast—and much more dangerous and 
horrible to those vvho are within its scope, I 
will not deny. For the ideas associated with 
the rule of the ocean, do not so much familiar¬ 
ize the mind to cruelty or injustice, as the 
associations connected with territorial sub- 


35 


jugation. The former involves an arbitrary 
control—over the great highway of wealth, 
power, and luxury;-—but the latter pursues 
mankind to the most sequestered retreats of 
social life*—and assumes a tyrannick command 
—over all that is indispensable to human 
existence. 

But as influencing the interests of the United 
States, the superiour horrour* of the one dan¬ 
ger, is balanced by the greater contiguity of 
the other; and in both, we learn the ne¬ 
cessity of reliance on our own resolution, 
rather than on the justice of either of these 
nations, obviously too ambitious to relin¬ 
quish when they can hold—or to forbear when 
they can invade. 

When as I have already observed, we con¬ 
template the hostility excited in Great Britain, 
and revert to that deeply rooted, and confirmed 
antipathy, by which it has been provoked: 
When we consider how wide are the respective 
views of right; and how little the correctness— 
or incorrectness of such views can operate, 
where power is right; what has the American 
nation to expect during the commercial siipre- 


36 


macy of that country ? The answer is tremen¬ 
dous—commercial vassalage ! Yet I do not 
hesitate to aver, that so long as Franee is to be 
considered as successour to the naval power of 
England—the destruction of this power, is 
deeply to be deprecated by the American pa¬ 
triot: and that he is indignantly obliged to hail— 
the partial and immediate restraints of the com¬ 
mercial vassal—in preference to the eventual 
shackles of the territorial slave. But instead 
of confining his eloquence to the more distant, 
and deleterious alternative—let him animate 
his countrymen, by an impartial picture of 
both. Let him exclaim—this is the more im¬ 
mediate—that the more injurious evil: Ameri¬ 
cans scorn to owe your freedom from the one— 
to a degrading dependency on the continuation 
of the other.'—You are the natural inheritors of 
the British power and glory—be energetick, 
and her fall will only open the avenue to your 
greatness—continue timid—parsimonious— 
and irresolute—and your ruin will be the ine¬ 
vitable consequence of her destruction. Inspi¬ 
red by the hope—and intent on the means of 
future redress—in imitation of the immortal 


Washington—restrain those impulses offer¬ 
ing, which are inconsistent with the permanent 
interests of your country. 

An appeal of this nature, if enforced by the 
powers of reason and eloquence, could not fail 
to divert the iVmerjcan people—from thatin- 
temperate indulgence of declamatory ire— 
which has perverted, or absorbed all the nation¬ 
al energy. It would coincide with the national 
feelings, which, are shocked by unqualified 
efforts to excite their apprehensions of France, 
and more especially as the prejudices of the 
great majority of the nation, are, in the oppo¬ 
site—and perhaps more injurious extreme. 

Considering all other nations as her natural 
foes, the true policy of America is to direct her 
whole energy to the creation of a power, 
adequate at some more favourable juncture— 
to elevate her above the evils of vassalage—or 
the fear of tyranny. The fall of Great Britain in 
that case—^^however deplored by all the humane 
and magnanimous—might by sound policy, be 
considered as propitious to the United States. 
Her naval power could never flourish under 
despotism—in its nature so hostile to com- 


38 


merce; and the loss of her sovereignty, would 
be followed by the extinction, or transplantation 
of all that renders her predominant. Her seamen 
would never become instrumental to French 
usurpation. Borne aloof in their invincible 
ships—they would securely deride the com¬ 
mands of the Usurper, and seeking assistance 
wherever wisdom should induce—and wealth 
should enable an ally to afford it, they would 
for a long time impede the maritime sway of 
their enemy: and might by a coalition with 
these states—check it for ever. That small, but 
invaluable portion of the British population— 
which would not have the opportunity glo¬ 
riously to die in defence of their country—and 
yet should be unwilling to grace the triumph of 
her conqueror—carrying with it her science, 
her arts, and arms, would seek shelter in her fo¬ 
reign dominions—or on these shores; should 
w^e not be destitute of thatenthusiastick sympa¬ 
thy, which a catastrophe so deplorable should 
inspire—a sympathy, not inconsistent with the 
views which I have taken of national conduct. 
For when national interest, coincides with the 
tendency of the generous passions; the con- 


39 


sequent excitement, is wholly attributed to 
these, by vanity and pride. Hence arises a 
sense of virtuous superiority, which enkindles 
in every bosom, an enthusiasm, at least, in ap¬ 
pearance noble—and in its effects benevolent. 
Such was the enthusiasm displayed by the 
French nation during our revolution—and such 
was the spirit which lately animated the British 
towards the Spanish cause. But we have 
found those Frenchmen who were so active 
in relieving us from our dependence—equally 
ready to impose chains upon Europe, and the 
same Britons who were so prompt in furnishing 
arms to Spain—no less alert in striking them 
from the grasp of Denmark. The one might 
injure—the other was about to serve their 
cause. Such is national virtue! 

But yet great as would be the stimulus of 
interest, that fertile source of national feeling, I 
acknowledge that there is a melancholy doubt 
as to the course we might pursue, in the event 
of the fall of that great nation. Such has 
been the infatuation of our government in 
respect to French aggressions—such the irre- 
solution in every momentous crisis, that, with- 


40 


out some great cliange—from parsimony—^ 
from ignorance—timidity—-or the seductive 
blandishments of France—we might hesitate to 
seize the golden moment—and might for ever 
lose the sovereignty of the ocean—nay our 
territorial independence—by an insane adhe¬ 
rence to an insidious peace. 

But the doubt thus excited, ought not to 
deter the patriot from enforcing the only counsel 
which is consistent with the permanent interest 
—and honour of the nation. He should strive 
to direct the national feeling into the only ser¬ 
viceable channel, and urge his countrymen ra¬ 
ther to seek the power—which may guard them 
from insult or oppression—than waste their 
energies in fruitless, and premature efforts to 
revenge them. Anger, unsupported by pow¬ 
er—can only excite contempt or exasperation; 
at all times irrational—it is particularly ab¬ 
surd—when indulged by one nation towards 
another. If there never was a people, whose 
power was restrained by justice or humanity- 
let us not wonder that France and Great Britain, 
are not thus restrained.^ Let us consider our 

* Previously to the usurpations of France, the na¬ 
tions of Europe may be considered as having formed 


41 


deprivations, as the result of the general de¬ 
pravity of national conduct, or to speak more 
strictly, let us deem them the natural con¬ 
sequences of their power—and our weakness; 
and let us direct every energy towards the 
correction of this weakness—as the only means 

a great political community, in which a system was 
tacitly established for the interest, and supported by 
the power of the whole. Hence, in their mutual in¬ 
tercourse, they have been necessitated to show some 
respect for abstract right—but in their conduct to 
other nations—an avowed system of flagrant injustice 
has ever been displayed. 

Any country not already inhabited or governed by 
any European people or potentate, has always been 
deemed a fair object of usurpation for the first of 
these who might claim it. A standard erected by a 
cruiser—has been considered a sufficient token of 
lawful empire. 

The slave trade has been permitted almost univer¬ 
sally by Europeans, and their colonists, and though 
of late forbidden in this country, and in Great Britain, 
this indispensable sacrifice to justice and humanity, 
was obtained with so much difficulty, and after so 
much procrastination, that there is much reason for 
the belief, that if there had been any general national 
interest favourable to it—this cruel traffick in human 
life or liberty—would never have ceased. But while 
beneficial to the avarice only of a part of a commu¬ 
nity-—and so opprobrious to the character of the whole, 
it proves little for national virtue that this infamous 


42 


of relief. Ur.til we shall have strength to stand 
alone against France—ruin must equally ei^sue 
from success or failure, in a contest with Great 
Britain. Unless by our hostility, we could 
diminish her naval power—our evils would be 
increased by exasperating her jealousy—and 
were we to humble her naval po'ver, we should 

practice should receive a check, after such long con* 
tinuance. 

By what right does Great Britain hold forty mil¬ 
lions of people in India, subjected to her power—and 
subservient to her interests ? I am disposed to believe 
that she governs them with more wisdom than their 
former masters, and consequently that they are hap¬ 
pier under her government. But this only proves 
that her interest is construed with wisdom and libe¬ 
rality—not that she is governed by abstract views of 
right. If she were influenced by such views—-she 
could not govern Hindoostan: as there cannot be a 
greater wrong—than that one nation should govern 
another. 

The greatest internal evils to which a country may 
be subjected by its government, can never justify the 
interference of foreigners—.since this would open an 
avenue to the greatest abuse. Were this an admitted 
justification for conquest, Bonaparte would have a very 
plausible apology for his invasion of Spain, which was 
obviously subjected to one of the worst governments. 
And the more flagitious the circumstances of this 
Invasion, the more must we deprecate the subjugation 


43 


precipitate that downfall, which under existing 
circumstances—w^ould expose us to a more 
dangerous enemy; who, by the double advan¬ 
tage of military and maritime force—would 
subject us to desolation and bloodshed—if not 
to slavery. 

Though England can subsist without us, 

of India—since, however different the practical con¬ 
sequences—the usurpation is in either case, the same 
in principle. 

Austria and Prussia have only experienced the 
reflected operation of their own principles—as exhi¬ 
bited in the partition of Poland:—and although the 
Spaniards have much cause to complain of French 
inhumanity and injustice, the annals of their own 
country rival those of any other—in cruelty and op¬ 
pression. Let them look back to their sanguinary 
conquest of South America—the oppression of Por¬ 
tugal and Holland—and the expulsion of the Moors 
from Spain. When reflecting on the captivity of their 
king—let them revert to the fate of the monarchs 
of Peru and Mexico—and of millions of their sub¬ 
jects immolated by fire—sword—or torture, to ava¬ 
rice and ambition. Let them contemplate the present 

ignorance_poverty—and servitude of their immense 

American dominions; where they behold the prospe¬ 
rity of one of the finest countries of the globe—and 
an immense population—sacrificed to the imaginary 
interests of an European peninsula—comparatively 
insignifiesmt. 


44 


she is not insensible to the great advantages 
of an amicable intercourse, and so long she 
is in dread of the growing power of her rival, 
she will be glad to purchase these benefits, by 
allowing us a commercial freedom, which her 
power enables her to deny. To refuse those 
advantages which her fears or necessities 
compel her to yield—because she will not 
grant us all, that in theory we might eorrectly 
demand, would evidently be impolitick—as 
on the other hand it would be disgraceful, if 
we could look forward with indifference to the 
permanency of that degrading predicament, by 
which the extension of our commerce—^is 
limited by its subserviency to her interest—^and 
the duration of our repose—dependent on the 
continuation of her power. 

Some Americans may exclaim, let us rather 
abandon the ocean, than enjoy such a partial, 
and degrading participation in maritime ad¬ 
vantages. To me however it appears, that a 
total renunciation of the ocean, is the lowest 
degradation; and the utter impossibility of 
enforcing this adandonment in practice, has 
already been demonstrated. A portion of our 


45 


countrymen are amphibious^ and we might as 
well forbid the birds to fiy^ or the fishes to 
swim> as deny them access to their favourite 
element. Besides, a total renunciation, cuts off 
all hope of future, as well as of present conlmer- 
cial power; , and should the command of the 
Atlantick ever fall into the power of any nation, 
on whom we should have no tie of interest, our 
seaboard might be frequently subjected to the 
inroads of hostility, and its horrid concomi¬ 
tants—plunder—and bloodshed. 

. By our situation, and by the genius of our 
government—a navy is our most effectual— 
and safest bulwark. It is the only engine of 
warfare, that can never aid in domestick op¬ 
pression—always terrible to our enemies—and 
never dangerous to ourselves. 

Nothing is better known to those who are 
familiar with history, than that the greatest 
incompetency of representative government, is 
in the emergency of sudden invasion: and that 
the necessity of intrusting to generals, or chief 
magistrates, authority to meet such emergen¬ 
cies, has frequently led to the downfall of 
popular liberty. 


46 


Were our shores unprotected by a navy, a 
large military force would in a state of warfare 
be requisite throughout the whole of our 
immense coast, to guard it from the sudden 
attack of the enemy. This would be no less 
oppressive in expense, and far more dangerous 
to liberty. In proof of the incompetency of 
militia, I will only refer to the opinion of 
the illustrious Washington—so often—and so 
forcibly expressed to congress, during the 
revolutionary war. 

When we consider that this great man had 
such full opportunity of experiencing this mode 
of defence—when we recollect his p»*e.eminent 
wisdom—and immaculate virtue—how is it 
possible to resist the weight of his authority ? 
In what respect can any individual presume to 
consider himself as competent to contradict this 
illustrious hero ?—Who is so arrogant as to 
think himself Washington’s superiour?—and 
more especially in a point, in which of all others, 
this celebrated general was most familiar!— 
Who deems himself to have more experience— 
more wisdom—or more virtue: and if he does 
not found his opinions on his own authority, if 


47 


he be disposed to receive them from another— 
shall it not be from Washington?—Who will 
venture to assert, that on a subject with which 
he was best acquainted, this great patriot was 
either so weak, as to be incapable of forming a 
correct opinion—or too dishonest to express 
what he really thought ? Shall we not rather 
distrust those, who would impeach—the virtue 
—or ability—of our immortal chief, by con¬ 
signing his views of the militia system, to that 
contemptuous oblivion—^which should only 
await the emanations of folly—ignorance—or 
deceit ?* 


The only obstacle to the creation of a navy— 
is the expense; but all history demonstrates, that 
no economy is so false—as that which leaves a 
nation defenceless. Governed by laws, which 

♦ I have annexed in an appendix some portions of 
the letters alluded to above. They afford such a 
weight of facts, arguments, and authority, all tend¬ 
ing to demonstrate the incompetency of militia; that 
it is difficult to conceive how any one, consistently 
with reason or candour, can uphold this engine as 
competent for our future defence. [See Appendix 
Note A.] 


48 


if they do not stimulate—are not injurious to 
industry—a prospect of wealth is open to us - 
greater than has ever been displayed to a 
nation, if we be well defended against foreign 
oppression. 

The riches of individuals are valued in pro¬ 
portion to their annual increase; were the same 
measure applied to national resources, where is 
the country that can boast of an equality with 
the United States ?—^Doubling our population 

and quadrupling our wealth, in the short 
space which is requisite to convert the infant 
into the man;—what may we not anticipate, for 
the great object of con^mercial emancipation ? 

The debts contracted for this invaluable pur¬ 
pose, must inevitably be answered, by the 
prosperity they ensure. Parsimonious views— 
would have checked our glorious revolution. 
The fear of bequeathing debt to posterity—is 
absurd. If we leave to them the power to 
defend their rights: and thus seeure their fu¬ 
ture opulence, we provide eventually, ample 
means to answer every draught. But if we 
should bequeath them—imbecility—and hope¬ 
less vassalage; we leave to them a burden, 


49 


which nothing can relieve;-—but those exer-* 
tions, which we should have taught them to 
neglect, by our ignoble inactivity, and irresolu¬ 
tion. Much tinre, and many opportunities have 
already been lost—greatly to the disadvantage 
of the cause:—for the later vve commence our 
exertions—the more remote the period of their 
efficiency. Our national vessel is embarked 
on a voyage, which must certainly terminate 
in a most prosperous issue;—if she be skilfully 
navigated—and courageously defended.—Shall 
vve then hesitate to borrow the arms and ac¬ 
coutrements, which will not only ensure us the 
means to repay the loan; but supply an ample 
fund for expenditure, in the great mart of na¬ 
tional prosperity ? 

The aversion of the majority of our coun¬ 
trymen from national debt, is our greatest ob¬ 
stacle. Familiar with the evils arising from 
insolvency, in any of the members of society; 
—by a false association, or analogy, they 
presume that the insolvency of a govern¬ 
ment, must be pregnant with consequences 
equally injurious to a nation. They are not 
aware that so long as the interest on publick 
w 


50 


debt is paid, insolvency in a government is only 
apparent. Nor do they see that credit is under 
some circumstances, equivalent to capital:— 
and that as much may be lost, by not employing 
credit—^as by not occupying capital. 

Nor is it wonderful, that impressions unfa¬ 
vourable to the operation of credit, and the 
influence of publick debt, should so much pre¬ 
vail, when we find them emanating from au¬ 
thority no less eminent than that of Hume and 
Smith. The writings of these great men, are 
now in the hands of almost every well educated 
politician, and have on our economical specu¬ 
lations, an influence, which though in gener^ 
well deserved, is I imagine, very injurious, so 
far as it has tended to cause or to confirm opi- 
nions, unfavourable to the employment of na¬ 
tional credit. It was predicted by these eminent 
writers, that this great engine of wealth and 
power would become ruinous, when exercised 
to an extent very much short of that to which 
it has since been strained by Great Britain.— 
The financial experience of that country, has 
since fully exposed the fallacy of these pre- 
dictions, which appear to have arisen from 


51 


the notion, that credit in its favourable ope¬ 
ration on publick wealth, acts merely as 
subsidiary to gold and silver money, of 
which it has been considered as the mere 
representative, and more especially, when 
brought into circulation, in the form of notes, 
bills, bonds, or certificates.* But attentive 
examination may show, that credit constitutes 
an original, and in some respects a peculiarly 
beneficial medium of interchange in trade, not 
only performing many of the operations which 
in its absence would be performed by specie, 
but a multitude which the latter cannot reach 
consistently with the ordinary current of human 


* « Comme Targent cst le signe des valeurs des 
marchaiidises, le papier est un signe de la valeur de 
Targent; et, lorsqu’il est bon, il le represente 
tenement, que, quant a Teffet, il n*y a point de 
difference/* \_Monte8quieu De UEsfirit Des Leix. 
Tome 2nd. p. 272.] 

“The whole paper money of every kmd which 
can easily circulate in any country, never can ex¬ 
ceed the value of the gold and silver of which it 
supplies the place, or which (the commerce being 
supposed the same) would circulate there, if there 
was no paper money/* Wealth of JVations^ 

Vol. I. p. 452.] 


52 


affairs. That credit is therefore collateral, ra¬ 
ther than substdiary, in its operation to gold and 
silver; and that these metals are not represented 
by it, but are merely the measure of its value, or 
medium of its exchange; in which respect they 
are rather subsidiary to credit, than the latter to 
them. 

One of the celebrated writers above 
quoted, has offered a well known illustra* 
tion,^ of the manner, and the degree, in 
which the precious metals are useful as the 
instrument of commerce, or in other words, as 
the medium of commercial interchange-—and 
from what causes the employment of them as 
such, is a measure of necessity among opu¬ 
lent nations. The object which I have in view, 
is to show the manner, and the degree in 
which credit performs the same office—and 
thence to deduce how far it should be consi- 
dered as constituting a portion of national 
wealth. 

'* I have from Smith’s Wealth of Nations, quoted 
this illustration in the appendix, and beg leave to 
refer ic U those readers with whom this subject may 
* not be familiar: for as credit, and gold and silver, as 
the means of interchange, derive their value from 


55 


The following I imagine to be a simple, and 
obvious illustration of the primitive operation of 
credit, as a mean of commercial interchange:— 
A raw material, being sold on credit, in lieu of 
remaining idle in the hands of the farmer, be¬ 
comes in those of the manufacturer, an useful 
article; and he is enabled to return the farm¬ 
er a better price, and to furnish the merchant 
or consumer, a larger and cheaper supply, 
for home consumption or exportation. The 
same or other merchants or manufacturers in 
the mean time, afford to the same or to other 
farmers, the necessary articles for consumption, 
or implemeius for agriculture, which would 
have remained useless in their shops or stores, 
unless the parties at the outset, should have a 
sufficient command of some substantial me¬ 
dium of interchange, to make their respective 
purchases. 

In the negotiation thus cited, each individual 
buys through the medium of his credit, and 

an agency in some degree similar—.a clear concep¬ 
tion of the operation of the one, must tend very 
much to facilitate our views of the operation of the 
other. [See Appendixj Note 


54 


the several persons concerned, may have cur¬ 
rent accounts with each other, without any 
reference to money, unless as the received 
standard of value. In this case therefore, the 
employment of credit, supersedes that of gold 
and silver, or any other substantial medium of 
interchange; and it may be considered as per¬ 
forming the office of such a inedium, in a 
limited degree. 

It is also apparent from this familiar illus- 
* tration, that the same quantity of land, labour, 
or capital stock, may be rendered much more 
productive with credit, than without it. Conse¬ 
quently the excess of efficiency gained ,through 
the influence of credit, is fairly attributable to 
it; and hence credit under all its productive 
forms, should be comprised in any estimate of 
wealth. For as land, labour, and capital stock, 
are solely valuable on account of their actual, 
or probable efficiency—credit so far as it 
increases this efficiency—must have equal 
pretensions to value. 

If a nation, or an individual has the power to 
borrow, when others have it not in an equal de¬ 
gree; and the first by these means, can attain 


55 


some valuable acquisition, or can avoid some 
serious loss, which cannot be gained or avoid¬ 
ed by the last; it is obvious, that the former, 
when compared tvith the latter, has more of 
the efficiency of wealth or in other words, is 
more wealthy. A valuable or productive quali¬ 
fication is possessed.—What is it worth?— 
The answer is plain—what it will bring. 

Under a strict system of law, where the pay¬ 
ment of debts is rigorously enforced, credit in 
that simple and primitive form in which it has 
has just now been depicted, so far as it answers 
the purpose of a medium of interchange, is 
preferable to money. The man who enjoys 
the one, has nearly an equal facility with him 
who commands the other, in the purchase of 
materials for trade, or manufacture. But the 
stimulus to industry, or exertion, is very differ¬ 
ent in the two cases. The mechanick who has 
an hundred dollars, can live without work so 
long as it lasts. He may spend the wjiole, or a 
part, in his pleasures, or for his sustenance, and 
may work proportionably less. Rut the me¬ 
chanick who can command credit to the amount 
of an hundred dollars, has nearly the same ca- 


55 


pacity to earn money, as the other; but his 
privilege will not sustain him in idleness, or 
dissipation. It can only be of use to him, 
through the medium of his industry; unless he 
is impelled by dishonesty, to become a swin¬ 
dler, and permitted by the law to be so with 
impunity. 

Were the advantages of a high state of mer¬ 
cantile confidence well understood in this coun¬ 
try, the laws against swindling would be much 
more severe. The man who borrows an hun- 
dred dollars and dissipates it by idleness, or in 
pleasure, should be prosecuted with greater 
severity than a thief; as he is more injurious to 
society. He not only destroys for his creditor 
the amount which he has borrowed, but by in. 
creasing distrust; or in other words, diminish, 
ing credit, he reduces the profit, and impedes 
the exertions of others, who are honest and in¬ 
dustrious. But this is not a necessary conse¬ 
quence of credit, at least the f. equency of such 
consequences, is very much dependent on the 
laws. 

It may however be demanded, wherefore 
should not the money obtained through the 


57 


medium of industry and credit, equallyfacilitate 
idleness or debauchery, as the same amount, 
when originally possessed. I answer that ere any 
one can by such means earn any considerable 
sum, his habits must receive a permanent bias 
favourable to economy and exertion. Expe¬ 
rience shows, that the money obtained by in¬ 
heritance or by fortuitous events, is very often 
squandered; while that which has been pro¬ 
cured by toil and care, is most frequently em¬ 
ployed, or disbursed, with prudence or fru¬ 
gality. 

The facility given to knaves and idlers, in 
their exactions from the honest and indus¬ 
trious, is the greatest evil of credit; an evil 
which can only be diminished by the most 
rigorous punishment of debtors, who by an 
obvious misapplication of the property which 
they borrow, prove themselves to be wanting 
in honesty. The rigid enforcement of penalties 
against all who thus live upon the publick, 
would tend to throw all the efficient power of 
credit into the hands of those who would make 
an honest use of it, who do not borrow, with¬ 
out a fair prospect of profit, and are necessarily 


t 


as 


industrious, that they may guard against the 
evils of failure. 

I have made this digression, in order to show, 
that those ill consequences which at fii*st sight 
appear to be the unavoidable concomitant of 
the prevalence of credit, in a great measure 
result from defects in the nature or execution 
of the laws; and that if these were more perfect, 
and more rigorously executed, credit would 
rather encourage industry, than open the door 
to idleness, or fraud. 

In fact there is no other medium by which 
the advantages of capital, can be diffused gene¬ 
rally and permanently throughout any nation. 
For were this object to be accomplished, by 
a judicious donation of gold and silver to 
every one who would make a profitable use 
of that command of the objects of trade, 
or implements, or materials of manufacture 
which they afford; although the immediate 
effects would be highly beneficial, in a few 
generations, the extravagance—idleness— 
or folly of some;—and the economy—the 
industry—and prudence of others, would 
concentrate the great mass of capital, in the 


59 


hands of a small number, compared with the 
whole population. 

The manufacturing or trading stock, which 
had been preserved by the care, or exertion ol* 
the father; would in many cases be dissipated 
by the sloth or extravagance of the son;—and 
the frugal and industrious son, would no less 
often be deprived by the indolent or extrava* 
gant father, of that command of capital, which 
had been conferred on his ancestors.—But 
credit being in great measure created by in¬ 
dustry, skill, and integrity—-the possessor of 
these in every well regulated society, will have 
a greater or less command of such portions of 
the general stock or capital, as he can employ to 
so much greater advantage than the possessors, 
as to afford them a greater compensation for the 
loan of it, than they could otherwise derive: 
provided, that his pretensions to credit be 
known to those, who may have the particular 
articles which it may be his interest to borrow, 
and their interest to lend. This last requisite 
however, in the ordinary course of affairs must 
be frequently wanting. However great the credit 
of a man with those who are acquainted with 
him, the number who may have this acquaint 


60 


tance, must always be limited; and very often 
among this number, that unoccupied capital 
will not be found, which it maybe his interest to 
procure. Hence to give a more general effi¬ 
ciency to the credit of individuals, banking 
institutions are established; which by the noto¬ 
riety of their wealth and punctuality, obtain 
universal credit: and by their extensive means 
of information, are enabled duly to estimate the 
degree of confidence to which traders may be 
entitled. The traders become responsible to 
the bank, and the latter to the community on 
receiving a due compensation for the accom¬ 
modation afforded, in giving a general effi¬ 
ciency to the credit of those, who otherwise 
could only exercise it within a limited sphere. 

By this investigation, I have endeavoured 
to prove, that as instruments of commercial 
interchange, there is a radical difference in 
the operation of credit, and that of gold and 
silver money. However great may be the 
quantity of these metals in a country, it 
does not follow that they will reach the 
hands by which they would be most profi, 
tably employed. The command of them, is 
the exclusive attribute of the wealthy, while 


61 


the command of credit, is the universal attri¬ 
bute of the honest, the skilful, and industrious. 
To employ the first as a mean of wealth, re¬ 
quires the previous acquisition of wealth, or in 
other words, that the effect should in some 
degree, precede the cause. To employ the 
last, only requires honesty, industry, and skill. 
Indeed honesty of principle, is not requisite, 
where the custom of trade, or the rigour of the 
law, renders a faithful payment of debts the 
most profitable course. Prone in common 
with all substantial and hereditary wealth, to 
subside into channels rather ample than nu¬ 
merous, the precious metals flow through a 
country in large streams, which carry out as 
much as they bring in, and contribute more to 
partial magnificence, than to general fertility: 
while credit, springing up in innumerable self- 
created rills, diffuses a fertilizing influence 
throughout every region. 

I trust it must be sufficiently plain from what 
I have advanced, that those who are endowed 
with mercantile credit, enjoy a valuable qualifi^ 


62 


cation or privilege in trade, when compared 
with those who have not this endowment. But it 
often happens that those who are in the latter pre¬ 
dicament are so situated^ that they could employ 
credit to advantage: while those who can com¬ 
mand it, have no direct opening for the em¬ 
ployment. It is not then surprising, that some 
mode should have been devised, by which the 
credit of the one, should be made efficient in the 
hands of the other. This has been effected by 
various instruments of writing, by which any 
individual, company, or nation, can alienate for 
a certain time, any portion of that credit, which 
hey cannot directly employ. 

The various papers thus endowed with alie¬ 
nated credit, have been designated by the ge- 
nerick term-—paper credit. This, as I have 
before observed, has been deemed the mere 
representative, or substitute, of gold and silver 
money;—but from the preceding inquiry, 
it does not appear that this supposition is 
warranted—since it has been shown, that the 
principle to which the paper is indebted for 
its activity—may exist—or spontaneously ori¬ 
ginate, under circumstances, in which the 


6S 


precious metals—do not exist—and cannot 
originate. 

Alienated credit may be no less current than 
coin, as in the case of bank checks or notes; or 
it may have a limited and sluggish currency, as 
in the case of mercantile notes, or bonds, bills, 
or certificates. 

In the case where it passes current, it an¬ 
swers the purpose of coin in circulation. In 
the case where it has only a limited currency, 
it takes the place of hoarded treasure. 

In either of the forms just delineated, or that 
more simple and primitive form at first describ¬ 
ed, credit virtually constitutes a portion of 
commercial capital. It may be said to be the off¬ 
spring of capital. This I do not deny, so fiir as 
capital inspires confidence: but in this respect, it 
only acts in common with all other sources of con¬ 
fidence. In fact capital is not always productive 
of credit; and the latter often arises without it. 
We sometimes trust the poor honest man, in 
preference to the wealthy rogue: and in a poor 
country, where morality is strict, and the laws 
rigid, more credit will be in operation, than in 
a rich country, where vice prevails, and the 


64 


laws are inefficient. A poor man may have 
credit upon the pledge of future earnings, 
though he pay a higher premium, on account 
of his probable insolvency, in case of death or 
sickness. Thus a poor supercargo may take up 
money upon respondentia, in which case the un¬ 
derwriters take a premium competent to balance 
those risks, which the debtor cannot control: 
but it is obvious that all the profit which the 
supercargo may derive upon the money thus 
taken up, beyond his commissions, is due to 
his credit with the underwriters, founded on a 
confidence in his integrity, on the coercive ope¬ 
ration of law, or custom; and on the disadvan¬ 
tage which he must incur, if by a failure in his 
engagements he should lose that credit, which 
is indispensable to his mercantile career. 

But though capital is not necessary to 
create credit, this can have no efficiency with¬ 
out it. It avails little that people are satisfied of 
credit, if they have no capi al to lend. Credit is 
therefore an accelerating cause, not a primary 
source of wealth: and its efficiency is regulated 
by the state of morality, the wisdom and cer¬ 
tainty of the laws, the quantity of capital, and 


65 


the field for its operation. It is not, however, 
limited by the quantity of capital within the na¬ 
tion, when there exists a free intercourse with 
other nations, where it abounds in greater pro¬ 
portion to the field for employment. 

In this we see the immense importance of 
fair dealing with foreigners, and of affording 
them the greatest legal facilities in the recove¬ 
ry of their debts. Should the foreign purcha¬ 
sers of our bank, or national stock, be at any 
time subjected to loss by the want of adequate 
legislative steadiness or support; it will cause 
an injurious diminution in the efficiency of our 
commercial credit, by limiting or reducing the 
quantum of capital, by which this credit is re¬ 
gulated. 


It has already been shown that among indi¬ 
viduals, credit as a medium of commercial in¬ 
terchange, has a more beneficial operation than 
money, in this important point: that the latter 
may be applied to the support of idleness or 
pleasure, whereas the former can only be 
productive through the medium of industry, 

K 


66 


and of course will incite the possessor to be 
industrious; unless he be willing by employing 
it dishonestly, to incur the evils of legal pu¬ 
nishment, of lost character, and of lost credit. 

Among nations, in a mode in some degree 
similar, credit as a medium of commercial in- 
terchange, has the advantage, when compared 
with gold and silver money. 

The nation which abounds with the latter, 
to a superiour extent, will not be industrious; 
but will buy of her neighbours, until her quan¬ 
tum is reduced nearly to the general level. It 
is well known in what manner this abundance 
destroyed the industry of Spain. ^ If the abun¬ 
dance should increase throughout the world, 
coin would be rendered less convenient by 
bearing less value in proportion to its bulk; but 
the efficiency of it, would not be increased. 
The effect of such a depreciation, is demonstra¬ 
ted by Mr. Hume, in his essay on money; 
though he appears to have erred in supposing, 
that it could arise from superabundance of 
gold and silver in one country alone. 

* See Montesquieu DTsprit des Loix; Tome 2d, 
page 258, 


67 


The nation on the contrary, possessing^ credit 
as a medium of commercial interchange, has 
that, which can only be of service, in affording 
facilities todomestick exertion: and the more it 
abounds, the more are these facilities aug¬ 
mented. 

It is observed by. Mr. Thornton, in his in¬ 
genious inquiry, that the aggregate of the na¬ 
tional capital, is not increased by paper credit; 
because if it forms an article on the credit 
side of the accounts of one man, it forms 
an equal debit on the contrary side of the 
accounts of another.^ But I answer, that 
although the nominal aggregate of the com¬ 
mercial capital is not increased, the efficien¬ 
cy of the whole, and consequently the real 
value is increased; and that in estimating his 
capacity to grow rich; each individual may 
with propriety inquire—not only how much 
property he has, and can employ profitably — 
but how much he can borrow, and employ 
profitably;—and that a greater power in the 
one respect—may balance a lesser possession 
in the other. 

* See appendix—note C 


68 


liciice ill a country where tiiere are many 
individuals, who possess this power to bor¬ 
row, and to employ profitably; there will 
virtually be more wealth than in a country 
where tiiere are few such individuals; although 
the quantity of substantial capital, and the 
held of profitable employment, should be 
equally great. The prevalence of paper credit, 
demonstrates at once the existence and the 
activity of this power to borrow, and profitably 
to employ; and it should of course be taken 
into consideration in any comparative estimate 
of the w^ealth of any two communities. For, 
though a considerable portion of the active 
credit in any community, will be employed to 
facilitate useless, fraudulent, or losing transac¬ 
tions; yet, the general and permanent employ¬ 
ment of it, is a sufficient proof that the aggrer 
gate benefit, much exceeds the aggregate evil: 
and it is by the excess of the former, over the 
latter, that we must rate the value of credit; as 
we compute the profits of stock, from the ba¬ 
lance of profit and loss. It is not an objection to 
the value of credit, that it is partially produc¬ 
tive of loss, or of fraud. Substantial capital is 


69 


often employed to the detriment of the owner, 
and of the community; but this does not de¬ 
prive capital in the aggregate of a value, pro¬ 
portioned to its average profit. 

If the trade of one nation be carried on by 
credit, and that of another be carried on by 
gold, there is no less reason for attaching value 
to credit in th.e first instance, than for attaching 
it to gold in the last. 

Any great extension or diffusion of the ad¬ 
vantages of credit, demands a high degree of 
security from internal disturbance, or external 
dangers; and an improved state of trade, law, 
and morality. Now’, when a nation from su¬ 
periority in these advantages, is enabled to 
perform with credit not only the greater part 
of those operations which other nations per¬ 
form with gold; but to enjoy from the activity 
of this invisible principle of w^ealth, a diffu- 
sion of the advantages of capital, and many 
W’ell know’ll conveniences or facilities which 
the precious metals cannot afford; she is ob¬ 
viously justified in taking this principle of 
wealth in all its active forms, into any computa¬ 
tion of comparative resources. * For absurd as it 
See appendix—note D. 


70 


would be to estimate debts in themselves under 
any form, as a portion of wealth, they ought ne-- 
vertheless to be computed as so many demon¬ 
strations of the beneficial activity of that credit, 
which in efficiency is proved to be more than 
equivalent to gold* 

The difficulty attendant on the conception 
that paper credit should be comprised in an 
estimate of national capital, arises from the 
notion, that the debt itself is the object of valu¬ 
ation; whereas the real object of valuation, is 
the principle by which the debt is enabled to 
exist: and the latter is only computed, as the 
measure of the activity of this principle. Hence, 
it is not an objection, that the paper is at some 
period to be redeemed. The extension of a 
note, is not attended by an extinction of the 
principle to which it is indebted for existence; 
and accordingly a new note like a phoenix may 
spring from its ashes, differing in substance, 
but possessing the same principle of vitality. 

Both the United States and Great Britain 
preeminently enjoy that security from commo¬ 
tion, or invasion, and that improved state of 
law, morality, and trade, which conduce most 


71 


to give efficiency to credit.* In comparing the 
resources of these countries with that of others, 
we should therefore form a very erroneous esti¬ 
mate, were credit excluded from valuation. 

It has been from the want of due attention 
to the advantage of a superiour capacity in the 
employment of this potent instrunjent, that 
ruin has so often been predicted, to be the 
inevitable consequence of the financial system 
pursued by the last mentioned nation; instead 
of the opulence, security, and power, wlvich 
have actually resulted. And on the other hand, 
a want of due comprehension of our own su¬ 
periour competency to use the same engine, is 
the principal cause of our present imbecility. 

An objection to credit as a medium of inter¬ 
change, may be founded on its liability to de¬ 
preciation in moments of alarm, arising from 
anarchy or invasion. This must undoubtedly 
at such periods, cause great embarrassment in 
trade; and much loss to individuals who hold 
large sums in paper, or alienated credit. But it 
is to be recollected, that the cost of credit ori¬ 
ginally is but little to the community at large. 


See appendix—note E 


72 


Hence, although it should depreciate to nothing, 
there would arise no great national loss; unless 
in the temporary diminution of profit, resulting 
from the stagnation of trade. But this stagna¬ 
tion in moments of national danger, would in 
great measure ensue, although gold and silver 
should be the medium employed; and at all 
events, the nation is gainer by all the wealth, 
which may have accrued during the inter¬ 
vening efficiency of credit. If actual invasion 
takes place, this depreciation may cause an 
eventual saving: as in lieu of specie, the plun¬ 
derer would find both the private and publick 
coffers filled with paper no longer endowed 
with the principle, to which it had owed its 
value. 

The retreat of the invaders, might be fol¬ 
lowed by a restoration of credit; but not by a 
restoration of the gold and silver, or other 
substantial and moveable property, of which 
temporary success might have given them the 
command. 

The very active currency of bank checks 
and notes, is due to their superiority over 


73 


gold and silver money, in conveniency of form 
and bulk; and to the excellent management of 
the banks; who, by keeping a sum always ready 
to answer demands, in a great measure avoid 
them, and thus extend and confirm the general 
confidence in their credit. In this case the ex¬ 
pense of giving currency to credit, is measured 
by the interest of the sum kept unemployed in 
their vaults. 

Bonds, bills, notes, bank stock, or national 
certificates, owe their more sluggish currency, 
to the payment of that interest, discount, or 
dividend, which renders it desirable or satisfac¬ 
tory to many individuals, to keep them in pre¬ 
ference to money; as they afford equal security 
against eventual want, and are productive of a 
revenue to the holder.^ 

The sum necessarily kept unoccupied by 
the banks to answer demands, being very small 
compared with the amount of their paper in 
circulation; the expense of supporting the cur¬ 
rency of bank notes or checks, is inconsidera¬ 
ble. That incurred in supporting the currency 
of the national certificates, is balanced by a 
See appendix—note F. 


L 


74 


proper application of the fund created by the 
sale of them. 

Making due allowance for the obligation 
annually to pay the interest, national borrow¬ 
ings may be considered as sales of credit; which 
under the form of the certificates, takes the 
place in the hands of individuals, of the proper¬ 
ty received by the nation in payment. The 
certificates may be considered as permanently 
sold; and if the property received in return for 
them, by expenditure in objects tending to 
defence or improvement—be productive of ad¬ 
vantage, or preventive of evil, adequate to its 
value—or to defray the annual expense of sup¬ 
porting the currency of the certificates—the 
means of the nation are virtually increased, by 
the whole amount of the sale, if the quantity 
sold be restrained within due limits. For the 
national stock thus created, forms a new, and 
most convenient medium of commercial inter¬ 
change; and consequently has no less value 
than those precious metals, which owe their 
usefulness principally to the same source. 

It appears from the illustration of the origin 
and use of money, to which I have already re- 


75 


ferred, that these metals comprise many quali¬ 
fications indispensable in an efficient circulating 
medium, and which are collectively found in 
no other substances. Hence so far as they are 
not superseded by credit, commercial nations 
are universally necessitated to employ them, as 
the medium of interchange. 

When not among the productions of a coun¬ 
try, the gold and silver required for this pur¬ 
pose, can only be purchased by an equivalent 
amount in the productions of agriculture or 
art: and when these metals are among the pro¬ 
ductions of a country, they are rarely to be 
procured without a degree of labour and ex¬ 
pense, nearly equal to their value. 

But unless we subtract the comparatively 
trifling expense, of the banks, and loan offices; 
or that incurred as above stated in supporting 
the currency of the national certificates, or the 
bank paper; alienated credit under either of 
these forms, constitutes a medium of inter¬ 
change, created without expenditure of labour, 
or advance of capital; and may be created when 
that command of labour and capital, which 
would be requisite to purchase any substitute, 


76 


may be totally out of the power of the nation. 
This inference is not hypothetical. Three 
fourths of the capital of the bank United States, 
originally consisted of national debt: yet upon 
this basis, was that credit founded, which has 
enabled this institution effectively to yield to 
the trade of the United States, sixteen millions 
of dollars. And hence it appears that these 
States not only gained by the employment of 
their credit, all those advantages which flowed 
from our glorious revolution; but that the cer¬ 
tificates issued to pay the debt thus created, 
became a most productive source of wealth: 
constituting that species of manageable proper¬ 
ty, which enhances the value of all other pro¬ 
perty, by facilitating commercial interchange. 

From this successful experiment of the ca¬ 
pacity of the national certificates, to answer one 
principal office of a medium of interchange, 
it seems that three-fourths of the capital of all 
the banking companies throughout the union, 
may consist of alienated national credit, under 
this form. A much larger proportion of the ca¬ 
pital of the ensurance companies, might be thus 
constituted. 


77 


From these data we may infer, that our pub- 
lick debt may accumulate in a regular ratio, to 
the demand for banking or ensurance capital; 
and as in these states bank paper, as a cir- 
culating medium, obtains a decided prefer¬ 
ence over gold and silver; it follows, that al¬ 
though our country is not rich in these metals, 
it is rich in an equivalent principle of wealth.^ 
To the profitable employment thus afforded to 
national certificates, we must add all that would 
be useful in the hands of individuals, or which 
we might sell abroad. 

In respect to the portion alienated abroad, 
some additional observations may be necessary. 
It is obvious that this portion must be ex¬ 
changed for foreign produce, manufactures, 
or specie. The usual course of exchange does 
not however admit of a return of specie. The 
inquiry therefore should be—whether by alie¬ 
nating credit, or by the ordinary means, the 
nation procures the foreign produce or manu¬ 
factures cheaper. When received in return for 
certificates, our imports cost us an annual in¬ 
terest. When obtained in the ordinary way, 
they are purchased directly or indirectly by an 
* See appendix—note G. 


78 


equivalent amount, in natural or artificial pro¬ 
ductions, The inquiry then resolves itself into 
the question—is it more advantageous to give 
interest for capital, or to exchange capital 
for capital? I answer that as the profits of the 
latter in this country, are immensely higher 
than the former, it is better for us to pay the 
interest, than part with the capital. Besides it is 
to be recollected, that our produce is not al¬ 
ways desirable to foreigners, in the degree in 
which their manufactures and produce is desi¬ 
rable to us. Hence we may procure capital from 
abroad, in return for our credit; which we 
cannot procure by the exchange of our staple 
productions. On the amount thus obtained, we 
pay interest at six per cent, and make a profit 
probably of twenty. When the government 
with the proceeds of its credit alienated abroad, 
purchases produce of the farmer or landholder, 
for defence or improvement; the nation in the 
first place gains by the excess of the advantage 
resulting annually from the improvement or 
defence, over the interest paid to the foreign 
creditor; and in the second place, by the superi- 
our efficiency of the property received, over 
tlvat which is consumed. Or by the advantage 


79 


of exchanging those raw materials of which we 
have a superabundance, for articles of which 
we are greatly in want. 

Nearly similar are the advantages which are 
derived from the sale of our bank stock in fo¬ 
reign countries. For though the proceeds of 
the sale go into the coffers of the banks, the 
means of the nation are equally increased; as it 
enables the banks to make greater advances, 
either to the government, or to individuals. 


The alienation of bank credit in the form of 
notes, might be deemed a permanent sale, if 
these institutions were permanent; but as they 
are temporary, it must be deemed a lease during 
the period of their existence. For though their 
notes may be returned by one individual, they 
are immediately paid away to another; the 
quantity alienated, being on the whole nearly 
the same. Banks therefore, may be considered 
as associations for creating and loaning credit. 
They may be said to lend their credit to traders, 
accepting of the credit of these under the form 
of mercantile notes, as security; the superiour 
currency of the bank credit, being compensated 


80 


by a discount. Were an institution of this sort, 
connected indissolubly with the government; 
the period of the lease might be considered as 
so remote, as to be equivalent to sale. 

There may be great difficulties in converting 
banks into national institutions, instead of being 
left to private companies; but it is certainly un- 
fair, that the whole of the profits resulting from 
them, should belong to the subscribers. The 
profit which they reap, is disproportionate 
to their exertions, and is derived from that 
efficiency of commercial credit in general, 
which ought not to be engrossed for the 
profit of any association in particular. At the 
establishment of every bank therefore, the 
publick may with propriety claim a portion of 
the stock, sufficient to prevent that rise in va¬ 
lue, which causes to the projectors a gain, quite 
disproportionate to their industry, or the capi¬ 
tal which they invest. This would prevent the 
injurious multiplication of these institutions, 
and would constitute a fair source of revenue; 
but it would be unjust to tax, and thereby to 
depreciate bank stock, when it has been trans¬ 
ferred into the hands of those who may have 
bought it after the rise has taken place. 


SI 


Banks, receive interest or discount for the 
loan of their credit. Governments, receive 
capital or services in return for theirs, paying 
interest as I have already observed, for the 
difference between the currency of their stock, 
and the currency of money. Were any mode 
contrived of giving greater currency to any 
portion of government paper, or stock; the 
annual payment on that portion might be di¬ 
minished; but at all events I do not conceive, 
that a government should borrow under the 
idea of repayment.—The alienation of the pub- 
lick credit, should be considered as a perma¬ 
nent, and complete sale; or at any rate, as a 
lease, terminating only with the extinction of 
the government, and of course accompanied 
by the cessation of all responsibility. For the 
right to receive the interest of a hundred 
dollars, is equivalent to this sum, so long as 
this right remains unimpeached. Though a 
debtor should be insolvent, so long as by his 
earnings he pays the interest of his debts, his 
creditors do not lose: and were he for ever to 
live, and to pay this interest, they would never 
be losers. It is in this predicament, that 


M 


82 


the creditors of a government may be sup¬ 
posed to stand. The government never dies; 
or at all events, its stability is equal to 
that of property in general, which yields an 
annual income. Or if the government should 
perish through anarchy or invasion, its debts 
are. answered as honourably, as those of any 
insolvent debtor, who is deprived of the power 
to meet his engagements by sudden death. 

The only idea which influences the pur¬ 
chaser of certificates, is their probable value in 
the market. The approach of the period assign¬ 
ed for their redemption, is generally found to 
diminish this value; and of course it is probable 
that an indefinite postponement of the period 
of redemption, would have an opposite effect. 
But if the idea of eventual repayment, be 
be supposed necessary to support the market 
price of stock;—is not this expectation easily 
answered by assigning a definite time for the 
payment of the certificates? The approach of 
this time would induce the stockholders to 
wish a postponement, in order to avoid the 
depreciation which usually follows: or at all 
events, the old debt might easily be paid, by 


83 


the proceeds of a new loan. In either case, the 
object of a perpetual alienation of credit, would 
equally be effected. 


Enough has been said to demonstrate, that 
the poorer classes of society are very much 
gainers, if the capital obtained from wealthy 
citizens, or foreigners through the medium of 
the publick credit, be employed in the exe¬ 
cution of designs worthy of its value. In any 
event, the poorer classes can have no reason to 
complain, as they can never be called upon to 
pay more than that annual interest, which is 
so trifling when compared with the annual ad¬ 
vantage, if the capital obtained by it, be invest¬ 
ed in objects permanently beneficial. I say per¬ 
manently, because it does not appear correct to 
employ the means afforded by credit, in de¬ 
fraying the ordinary expenses of government. 
This would in truth be a robbery of posterity; 
and in order to avoid a measure so replete 
with opprobrium, the publick credit should 
only be resorted to under circumstances, w'hcre 
the permanent character, or prosperity of the 
nation may be at stake. 


84 


The fear of an eventual necessity of taxation, 
as the means of repaying national debt, is 
absurd. The imposition of taxes requires 
stability and energy in the government, and 
consequently the continuance of that credit, 
which renders taxation useless. The creditors 
of the government, will always be aware that 
the people will not submit to a measure s6 
oppressive. On this account they will ever be 
adverse to taxation; as instead of furnishing the 
means of repayment, it would endanger the 
stability of the government, and consequently 
the firmness or value of that credit, of which 
they will have become the proprietors. 

In Great Britain, where, from the pressure 
of the times, money has been borrowed to an 
extreme probably injurious, and only to be 
justified by absolute necessity; the utter impos- 
sibility of repaying her creditors is admitted, 
yet these are content. It is true that the in¬ 
terest of her debt alone, appears to be very 
burdensome; but as the people can never 
be called upon for the payment of the princi¬ 
pal, if this has been spent in objects durably 
advantageous, they are gainers proportionably. 


Whether it has, or has not been spent to 
advantage, is of no importance to my argu¬ 
ment; since no one can deny, that it might 
have been well spent. And without attempt¬ 
ing to justify much fruitless, and perhaps 
illjudged continental warfare; it seems to me, 
that the advantages resulting—from the pre¬ 
servation of her liberty—the protection of 
her industry—and the conquest of the ocean 
—are more than equivalent to all her expen¬ 
diture. Her domestick tranquillity by these 
means ensured, has by the great improve¬ 
ment consequently arising in her arts, and 
manufactures; enabled her to obtain from a 
large portion of the world—a voluntary tribute 
to her ingenuity and skill—while by her all 
powerful navy, she exacts upon the ocean—an 
involuntary obedience to her power. 

When we pity her artists, or manufacturers 
for the taxes which they support, we should not 
forget that we buy their productions at a pro¬ 
portionate advance. But what magnanimous 
patriot—will consider this as a cold question 
of pecuniary calculation ?—Were Great Britain 
relieved from the unnecessary expenditure in 


86 


the support of an injurious pomp and luxury— 
who would hesitate to say—she has exercised 
a noble extravagance ?—For what sum can be 
equivalent to the sovereignty of the ocean—or 
to the trident of Neptune—which sways un¬ 
controlled three quarters of the globe?— 
What noble Briton is unwilling to share his 
portion of burdens—which render him a par¬ 
ticipator—in such a glorious pre-eminence? 
And shall Americans prefer a grovelling com¬ 
mercial inferiority—to a publick debt—the 
expected evils of which, are proved to be 
imaginary; while the advantages may be 
equivalent—to national salvation—-or to the 
difference between the degrading situation in 
which we now repose—and that glorious 
rank to which we should have been elevated 
—by the policy of Washington, and his co¬ 
adjutors? 


I will now venture to hope, that the reader 
who has honoured the preceding investigation 
with a careful scrutiny, will be ready to admit, 
that by not employing efficient credit in objects 


87 


of improvement or defence, a nation may be 
just as much a loser, as if these objects were 
neglected, when the requisite means should re¬ 
main idle in the national coffers. Also that in 
the worst event, the poorer classes of society 
can never be called upon to pay a publick debt; 
the stockholders alone, being in the worst issue 
liable to loss. 

The stockholders are of course the best 
guardians of their own money; and best able to 
judge, how far they may venture to exchange 
it for certificates of debt, and for what remu¬ 
neration. Let us therefore proceed to consider 
the operation of the fund produced by the ex¬ 
change, when employed under that vigilant 
jealousy, which guards the disbursements of 
popular governments. Let us consider, how 
much profit would be afforded to the farmer, 
the landholder, the mechanick, or manufac¬ 
turer, in the expenditure of ten or twenty mil¬ 
lions, in the construction of a navy. The 
money expended remaining in the country, the 
actual expenditure of the national wealth, 
would be in the produce or labour of the coun¬ 
try; or what they purchase from abroad. From 


/ 


88 


the whole amount thus expended, however, we 
must deduct all those profits or wages, which 
would not have been earned but for this extra 
demand. We must deduct the timber, or iron, 
which would have remained useless in the fo¬ 
rest or in the mine; and those hours of idleness 
which would have occurred, had not the stimu¬ 
lus of the national credit, incited industry to 
unusual efforts. For it should be recollected, 
that a people are not made poorer or less happy 
by a system, which causes considerable expen¬ 
diture; if at the same time it occasions an 
equivalent increase, of the demand for produce, 
and of stimulus to industry. A nation is always 
rendered more cheerful by brisk occupation. 
In every department of life, much time is wast¬ 
ed, or much exertion omitted, from the want of 
some profitable or interesting excitement to ac¬ 
tivity. Those persons who are the most subject¬ 
ed to such excitement, are always the most 
happy; and it will be found that the habit of in¬ 
dustry becomes so forcible, and so much im¬ 
proves by exercise, that men w^hose avocations 
are the laborious and urgent, are often found to 
execute each minute duty with more exactitude 


89 


than they are executed by others of whom the 
occupations are few and unimportant. A little 
extra exertion in eight millions of people, will 
have wonderful effects, and more especially, 
when freed from those jOppressive exactions, 
or unsurmountable obstacle^, by which indus¬ 
try is* checked or depressed throughout the 
greater part of the globe; and while enjoying 
an extensive and luxuriant territory, in fertility 
so much surpassing, every immediate, and 
pressing want. 

A very small increase of individual assidu¬ 
ity, would cause an annual augmentation of 
produce equivalent to ten dollars for every 
effective man; and supposing all the effective 
labour of the eight millions to be equal to two 
millions of such men; the national means, by 
such an increase of effort, would be augmented 
annually by twenty millions of dollars. 

It is not correct to say, that we produce 
already as much as we can. The prodigious 
amount of our exports during periods of ex¬ 
traordinary foreign demand, sufficiently proves 
that in ordinary times, we have not full em¬ 
ployment for our means of production. 


But in addition to all these flattering views of 
our national resources—we are diurnally in¬ 
creasing them. The credit of the United States 
is susceptible of useful employment, in a ratio 
to their wealth and population nearly invari¬ 
able. If at the period of the establishment 
of the federal government, we supported with 
facility, debt to the amount of seventy mil¬ 
lions of dollars, w^e may now with no less ease, 
support quadruple the amount. For since upon 
an average we may conclude, that at least 
twice the quantum of wealth would now be 
found in art* equal number of persons: it fol¬ 
lows, that while our population has doubled, 
our wealth has attained a fourfold increase. 

Were our prosperity to continue equally 
^reat, in twenty years we might multiply by 
iour, this fourfold capacity to employ our 
national credit, without altering the correct¬ 
ness of its proportion to that capital, by which 
its efficiency is limited. 

It cannot be denied that it is always correct 
to borrow, when the advantage to be gained, 
or when the evil to be warded off by means of 
the money borrowed, is much greater than the 
expense of the loan. 


91 


The only objection to borrowing, is the un¬ 
certainty of the issue of the trade, in which the 
loan may be invested. But the United States 
may be considered as a trader, whose prospe¬ 
rous returns are mathematically certain, if 
through timidity or negligence, he does not 
refuse, or neglect the advantages, which are 
strowed in his path. 

The influence of a vigorous system of exter¬ 
nal defence, and of internal improvement of 
roads and navigation, furnish an ample and se¬ 
cure field for the employment of our national 
credit. Shall we then from a shortsighted, 
erroneous parsimony, neglect to employ this 
potent mean of wealth and power ? 

The advantage of our remote situation would 
give to twenty ships of the line, as an engine of 
defence, an efficacy very much greater than 
an equal number in Europe; and especially 
during the boisterous season. A gale would do 
more for us than a victory, in removing hos¬ 
tility from our shores: and our ships sallying 
out in pursuit of the straggling, and dismantled 
remnants of the enemy, would find them an 
easy prey. 


92 


The cost of such an armament would be 
much inferiour to the amount, of which we 
have been robbed, or deprived, through our 
maritime imbecility, independently of that loss 
of honour and character, which surpasses va¬ 
luation. 

Had our harbours been properly defended, 
Pearce had not been killed, nor the Chesapeake 
attacked; and vve should have escaped many 
other indignities, resulting frorn the arbitrary 
and unawed authority of subaltern command¬ 
ers. They would not have dared to commit 
acts involving actual war. They were aware 
that this was not the interest of their country. 
England never wished war with America, and 
the mass of the democratick party, together 
with their principal leaders, have always been 
really averse from war with England. Nothing 
was more inconsistent with the tameness of the 
policy of Jefferson. He menaced war, as many 
do who are unwilling to fight: but it is impos¬ 
sible to discover during the whole of his pre¬ 
sidency, a single efficient belligerent prepara¬ 
tion. Had his opponents urged w^ar with 
England, they would infinitely more have 


93 


perplexed him, than by opposing it. There is 
a faction in the seaports disposed to war with 
that country, influenced by resentment, or an 
ill founded hope of profitable captures; but the 
mass of his partisans, know the futility of their 
system, in time of war. 

To estimate the advantageous consequences 
of a very small maritime force, in preventing 
the outrages of France; let us only revert to the 
period when Truxton, and others, so success¬ 
fully employed the small armament intrusted 
to them. However incompetent our power to 
oppose the navy of England, we might at least 
retaliate the aggressions of Napoleon. 

Having now completed the design prescribed 
at the commencement of this pamphlet, I shall 
conclude with some desultory observations; 
duly forewarning the reader, that they do not 
strictly relate to the subject of the preceding 
pages. 

Although in the course of these essays, I 
have adverted to the evils of popular govern¬ 
ments—and have censured the errours of that 
under which we live; I hope it will be under- 


94 


stood^that I censure as a friend—^not as an 
enemy. Th6 more we are attached to this form 
of government—the more we should deprecate 
those Extremes, which have in all ages caused 
the disgrace and destruction of popular liberty. 
But all governments have their defects; and it 
is only in the management of our exteriour re- 
lations-^that we have very serious cause for 
complaint. If in respect to our interiour go¬ 
vernment we have less cause for pride, or ex¬ 
ultation than other nations—-we have much less 
cause for grief. 

Through the ignorance of our state govern¬ 
ments—some local grievances have arisen—^and 
more no doubt will arise.—Some good laws 
will be repealed—and many bad onps will be 
enacted—but where is the country, which is 
exempt from the evils of erroneous legislation ? 
It is true our government has little power to 
restrain the people from excesses—but no 
people are so little disposed to commit them. 
At our popular elections or town meetings, 
where passions are most excited, it is rare to 
experience the slightest insult or personal vio¬ 
lence. 


95 


Through the general dilFusion of wealth— 
there is no country more secure from the worst 
consequences of anarchy than this; because 
there i is none, where there are so many inte« 
rested, in the preservation of property. When 
the iudendiary , lights his torch“the yeoman 
will think of his barn—and will snatbh his 
musket in defence of his-neighbour’s house— 
lest the flames :should extend to his own. 

Though: from its entire submission to the 
will of the people, our administration is limited 
to that shortsighted, and erroneous policy, 
which IS prescribed by an ignorant, though well 
meaning multitude; yet there are advantages 
which result from this state of things. . We are 
rarely distur|)ed; by riot, for the wishes of the 
people being ^nerally considered in preference 
to their welfare, they have rarely the slightest in¬ 
centive to such extremes. Had not the igene- 
ral: governnient beerf supported by the popula¬ 
rity thus obtained, it could never have enforced 
the laws of the union against the state of Penn¬ 
sylvania in the case of Gideon Olmstead. Sup¬ 
ported by the populace—the governour would 
not have yielded—and could not have been 
subdued. - ‘’ff ’ d V': 


96 


Possibly we were indebted for our tranquil¬ 
lity not only on this occasion—but on many 
others, to that confidence of the people in the 
general government, which results from its in¬ 
variable obedience to their will; and to the 
sedulous pursuit of the system, which is most 
agreeable to their prejudices. For the princi¬ 
ples of true policy in government, being as re¬ 
condite as those of any science; requiring for 
development, all the assiduity of the analyst, 
and all the subtlety of a metaphysician, they can 
only be displayed to those who have leisure for 
study. Hence the conduct of men who are 
governed by these principles, can never be un¬ 
derstood; and of course cannot often be ap¬ 
plauded by the mass of the people. To how 
much abuse was the great and good Washington 
subjected for that treaty with Great Britain; 
by which so many years of commercial pros¬ 
perity were ensured to us ?—Had the opposite, 
and more popular policy been adopted—all 
our present difficulties had overtaken us fifteen 
years ago, when we were so much less capable 
of supporting them. 

How far the advantages of internal tranquil¬ 
lity, may balance the evils resulting from that 


97 


erroneous policy, which may be considered as 
the price of this tranquillity, I shall leave it to 
others to determine; but 1 should wish rather 
to see a midway course adopted, between that ^ 
total disregard of popular opinion, which has 
been demonstrated by the federalists—and that 
servile submission which has been displayed by 
their successours. We should not be govern¬ 
ed merely by the question of right in the ab¬ 
stract—but by that of utility in practice. By ft 
few transient laws, the federalists reversed the 
politicks of their country-^and from a futile 
effort to serve it in one way—forfeited the 
power of rendering it permanent service, in any 
other. 

May not the late relapse in the politicks of 
New England, be attributed to the disregard 
of popular feeling, exhibited by the federal 
leaders ? 

With due deference to the talents and inte¬ 
grity of these worthies, 1 beg leave to inquire, 
whether it is not impolitick by a frequent de¬ 
fence of the measures of Great Britain; to con¬ 
firm in the popular mind, the unjust suspicion 
of their subserviency to this power, which h 


o 


98 


so studiously inculcated by their opponents? 
Whether the measures of Great Britain and 
France, be in the abstract right or wrong; or 
whether either of them be more censurable 
than the other, ought not to have the smallest 
influence on the policy of our country. The 
only inquiry should be, whether the measures 
of either, or both of these powers, are injurious 
to our welfare. Whether right or wrong—if in¬ 
jurious to us—upon the ordinary principles of 
national conduct, if possessed of adequate pow¬ 
er, we should be authorized to force a change, 
on the part of either or both. Nor should we, 
in choosing the primary object of attack, be 
governed by any other question, than that of 
expediency. 

The assumption of this unpopular task of 
defending a foreign government appears to be 
the more impolitick, since the event has shown 
it to be unnecessary. There was always an un- 
surmountable barrier to warfare with England. 
1 mean our total incapacity to commit a single 
offensive act, which could in the slightest de¬ 
gree humble her pretensions. If this glaring 
fact, and the incompetency of the financial 


99 


system of the ruling party, were not sufficient 
obstacles to war; what were we to expect from 
arguments obnoxious to the feelings of the 
people. 

The leaders of federalism have sacrificed 
their popularity to prevent hostilities, which 
their more crafty opponents threatened, but 
knew themselves incompetent to wage. 


In the abstract I imagine, few are friends to 
monarchy. In theory, nothing in my view can 
be more absurd, than to elevate an indivi* 
dual above his species in rank and power, 
without any regard to virtue, or talent. In the 
best constituted governments, he is a mere 
pageant: and where he is the most efficient, is 
most dangerous. Yet in practice it must be 
admitted that this form of government with all 
its absurdity, has been found the best suited to 
nations in general. The safety of most countries 
surrounded by enemies, requires that the chief 
magistrate should be invested with great pow¬ 
ers; for the same reason that the fiercest repub- 
licans have submitted to the most rigid military 


( 


100 


discipline; or that they yield to the captain, an 
absolute command over his ship when at sea* 
Through the remoteness of our situation, we 
have hitherto been free from those dangers, 
which render such povi^er requisite: and a dif¬ 
fusion of property, and intelligence, unusually 
equable, tends peculiarly to fit us for a repre¬ 
sentative government. 

Here then would ensue a most favourable 
experiment of a democratick republican go¬ 
vernment, did we not labour under two radical 
evils—I mean an indiscriminate admission to 
the privileges of citizenship—and a universal 
enjoyment of the right of suffrage, unqualified 
by any restriction which may tend to secure 
the competency of the elector, to judge of the 
real tendency of his vote. 

Next to the passion of love, or the nearest 
ties of consanguinity, the love of country is ob¬ 
viously the most deeply rooted of all human 
attachments Though in temporary power ex¬ 
ceeded by other sentiments, in permanency it 
yields to none, unless to parental affection; nor 
can w^e doubt, that as the latter was obviously 
inspired by the Creator for the support or pro- 


101 


tection of all animated nature in the early stages 
of life; so the former was intended as one of 
the most powerful bonds of society, in mo¬ 
ments of national danger. 

To cherish and obey this predisposition, so 
obviously the result of divine will, has hereto¬ 
fore in ail ages and nations, been deemed a 
sacred duty. No people ever glowed with more 
of this patriotick spirit, than did the people of 
these states during the struggle for indepen¬ 
dence—yet with shame it must be spoken—no 
nation has ever done so much towards depre¬ 
ciating the value—or destroying the force of 
the tie—between the native and his country. 
No people ever so indiscriminately welcomed 
—genius or stupidity—ignorance, or know- 
lege—virtue, or vice—the fugitive from jus¬ 
tice—or the voluntary and respectable emi¬ 
grant; and promiscuously invested a motley 
groupe of foreigners thus assembled—with 
all the privileges and imnlunities of native 
citizens. 

It is astonishing that the monstrous absurdi¬ 
ties which result from this practice, could ever 
have been overlooked. If we argue that foreign- 


102 


ers have the right to transfer their allegiance to 
oiir government at any time^ or in any mode 
which we may appoint—it follows t^t our citi¬ 
zens have the right to transfer their allegiance to 
foreign governments at any time, and in any 
mode that the latter may appoint; unless it be 
advanced that the natives of these states alone, 
of all mankind, have not the power of expatria¬ 
tion. But if the native citizen has the right to 
expatriate himself whenever he pleases—has 
not the naturalized foreigner the same option? 
His ties cannot be said to be stronger than 
those of citizenship; and these admit of a trans¬ 
fer of allegiance at any moment. Of .what 
value then is his oath ? The contract formed 
with him, is optional on his part—and obliga¬ 
tory on ours. - — 

Thus by the sanction which w^e afford to the 
practice of expath'iation, is every legal and 
moral duty of the citizen towards his country, 
whether native or adopted, made dependent in 
its duration upon will. The principle establish¬ 
ed by the formation of the contract, is destruc¬ 
tive of its efficacy; and the value of the title 
granted by it, is depreciated by the frequency 


103 


and facility of the grant. While by a transfer 
of allegiance, the naturalized foreigner in com¬ 
mon with the native, is at liberty at any moment 
to emancipate himself from every tie, founded 
in law or morality; those naturally arising in 
the bosom of the patriot, are no less enfeebled, 
when he beholds the privileges of citizenship— 
otherwise to him—so sacred—and so dear— 
lavished upon every outcast of Europe—whom 
crimes—or misfortunes—may have driven to 
our shores. 

Both morality and sound policy demand, that 
we should extend to the straiiger all possible 
civility and assistance, and that we should per¬ 
mit him to enjoy in tranquillity, all those neces¬ 
saries, comforts, and pleasures, which he may 
be enabled to procure, either through his wealth 
or industry: but surely it cannot be requisite, 
that we should extend to him any right of par¬ 
ticipating in the government of the country. 
If not devoid of integrity, he will only value 
the right of suffrage so flir as it may enable him 
to conduce to an able and honest administration 
of affairs; and at all events the accomplishment 
of this object, can be the only justifiable motive 


104 


for extending the right of suffrage. Were this 
privilege to be granted with any other view, 
we should overlook our own essential wel¬ 
fare—for the sake of a useless—or injurious 
compliment to an alien. 

The question then arises—will the chances 
of a wise and honest administration of affairs, 
be increased by extending to foreigners the 
privileges of voting? The honesty and ability 
of those who govern, must be determined by 
the degree in which virtue prevails over vice 
—and wisdom over folly—among those by 
whom they are chosen. If then in the United 
States the preponderance of virtue over vice, 
and of wisdom over folly, be sufficient, whence 
can arise any advantage, either to ourselves, or 
to foreigners, from admitting them to the right 
of suffrage. And if the preponderance should 
unfortunately take place in the opposite scale, 
will it be counteracted by the assistance of 
emigrants taking them in the agregate ? 

Does the indiscriminate admission of this 
class of persons to the privileges of citizenship 
—tend to increase the proportion of wisdom 
and virtue;—or to add to the overstock of 
folly and vice ? 


105 


No emigrant will advance, that the best citi¬ 
zens of his native country have expatriated 
themselves* All will acknowledge that among 
the whole number who go abroad, the proper- 
tion of talents virtue and information, is less 
than among those who stay. This simple view 
must be sufficient to convince us, that in ad¬ 
mitting foreigners to participate in our elec¬ 
tions—the ratio of folly to wisdom—and of 
vice to virtue—is increased—rather than dimi¬ 
nished: unless we admit—that this ratio of 
folly and vice, to wisdom and virtue, is in our 
country much less favourable—than in those, 
whence the emigrants come. 

The position being then established, that the 
admission of foreigners to the right of suffrage 
will rather derogate from, than conduce to the 
propriety of our elections, any honest emigrant 
who may be duly aware of the ill consequences 
of the practice, would rather wave, than accept 
the privilege. There can however be no doubt, 
that among the many of those who emigrate, 
this refined political integrity would be found 
wanting; and that they would choose to be 
placed upon a level in privileges with the native 

F 


106 


citizen, however injurious the consequences in 
the aggregate, to the good of the nation. But 
if any of them under these views, should be 
discontented, it is better they should adhere to 
their own soil, than that we should to afford 
them satisfaction, hazard the welfare of the 
United States. 

If there be men who are so wicked, so weak, 
or so ignorant; as to wish to participate in the 
government of our country, at the expense of 
its prosperity—their presence must be a curse, 
their absence a blessing. 

It is now ascertained by experience, that our 
numbersare doubled every twenty three years.^ 
Were our population to continue to accumulate 
in the same proportion, in about one hundred 
and seventy years, a period less than that which 
has intervened since the first settlements w'ere 
made in Virginia and New England, the pos¬ 
terity of the present inhabitants of the United 
States alone will be more than twelve hundred 
millions—supposing our numbers to have been 
only five millions at the last census. 


Blodgetts Economica, page 79. 


107 


It follows, therefore, that as it may affect 
the future extent of our population, the influ* 
ence of emigration is insignificant, and can but 
ill compensate for any diminution in that pros¬ 
perity, by which our multiplication from inter¬ 
nal sources is so much accelerated. The mul¬ 
tiplication of our numbers is in truth injurious, 
so far as it is not the consequence of prosperity, 
as it tends to hasten the period when our terri¬ 
tory will be too thickly peopled for easy sub¬ 
sistence; or to extend population so widely 
over this continent, as to produce those divi¬ 
sions, and dissensions, which must always arise 
from the discord of heterogeneous interests. 

By the jarring operation of discordant pas¬ 
sions, the new continent, like the old, will be 
divided among nations various, and hostile: and 
the bloody scenes which have so often been ex¬ 
hibited in Europe, Asia, and Africa, will be 
reacted here. 

When not confined by the pressure of want> 
so active is the increase of our species, that the 
period is not very remote when America will 
attain that acme of excessive population, which 
more than any other state of affairs—is followed 


108 


;by an incurable wretchedness—and degradation 
among the poorer classes of society. Where¬ 
fore then should we in the slightest degree risk 
our happiness, to accelerate consequences so 
so much to be deprecated ? So far as the rapid 
increase of population is the consequence of 
national felicity, we should hail it with delight: 
but so far as it is the effect of emigration, it 
must be considered as an encroachment on the 
field allotted by fortune—to ourselves—and 
our posterity* 

If the privileges of the native citizen, are in 
any case to be bestowed upon foreigners, nature 
herself points to the occasion. When by mar¬ 
riage with a native, and by the birth of a child, 
a man has incurred ties paramount to those 
which he owed to his own country; he may 
then possibly with some propriety, transfer his 
allegiance from his native soil, to that wherein 
his child and his wife have first drawn their 
breath. If naturalization was to be introduced, 
wherefore was not this natural change of affec¬ 
tions and duties, taken as the only adequate 
recommendation to confidence ? 


109 


A limitation thus founded, might palliate, 
but would not cure the evils of a practice so 
absurd and injurious. 

My objections to the present system of suf¬ 
frage, are not founded on desire to deprive the 
mass of mankind of their inherent rights to self 
government—but on a desire to secure the ad¬ 
vantageous exercise of this right, by restricting 
it to objects of which the mass of society are 
competent to judge. When incapable of under¬ 
standing the tendency of their suffrages, they 
cannot be said to enjoy their votes. They may 
vote for measures tending the very opposite of 
the consequences which they really wish. 

The legislator cannot endow a man with that 
w^hich God has denied. If through the defect 
of nature, or education, he be incompetent to 
understand the true tendency of political mea¬ 
sures; it is impossible that he can have any 
correct wish, or opinion about them. Unless 
therefore, his vote can be directed to something 
about which he can judge and think correctly, 
he really has no vote, but the dangerous privi¬ 
lege of a capricious interference with the helm 
of his own, and of the publick safety. Though 


110 


he is nominally the elector, his choice is really 
directed by those who assail his passions, and 
he is still governed by the few, and unfortu¬ 
nately not by that few who are most competent 
in wisdom and virtue~since these would ad¬ 
dress his reason—not his passions. 

The candidates are generally selected by a 
few of the most active, but not ahva} s the most 
respectable of the community; yet the choice 
of the candidate determines the election of tlic 
representative, for though the individual thus 
recommended is often obnoxious even to the 
majority of his owm party;—there is no appeal 
from the fiat of those ill constituted assemblies, 
by which he may have been brought forward. 

Those w'ho point out defects—may be 
expected to suggest remedies. The remedy 
which I should propose, would be founded in 
this principle; that every man should have as 
much influence in the construction of his 
government, as his talents and information will 
permit. These qualifications among men, 
whose diurnal occupations deny them the ad¬ 
vantages of study, can go no further than 
enable them to choose who shall choose for 


Ill 


them. It is requisite, however, that each indi¬ 
vidual, should, from his personal knowledge, 
judge of his elector. This knowledge it is 
obvious cannot generally extend to such as do 
not live in his neighbourhood, or township. 
From these, however, he can select the man, 
on whose judgment he would prefer to rely. 

The latter will probably possess some supe¬ 
riority of intelligence, and will be as well able 
to select the most competent man in the 
county, as the first was to choose the one the 
most competent in the township. The elector 
chosen for the county, will in all probability 
be equally capable to point out another to re¬ 
present the district; and the latter may equally 
well elect for the state. By these means, 
our township, county, and district meetings, 
would be legally constituted; and every indivi¬ 
dual would enjoy a greater equality of privi¬ 
lege, because he would exercise his suffrage^ 
upon a question, on which he would be per¬ 
fectly competent to foresee the real object of 
his vote. It would be a question about men, of 
whom he can judge; and not about measures 
of which he cannot form a competent judg¬ 
ment, without study. 


112 


Instead of making wealth a requisite qualifi¬ 
cation in a voter, it should have a separate re¬ 
presentation, forming a distinct branch of the 
government, and exercising a veto in all ques¬ 
tions influencing property. Nothing can be 
more unjust, than to subject the poor to the 
rich, or the rich to the poor: but each consti¬ 
tuting different branches, no oppression could 
ensue, but necessity would oblige them to 
concur in objects mutually beneficial, as it is 
well known, they are indispensable to each 
other. The impropriety of giving to wealth no 
influence in our government, is the more gla¬ 
ring, on account of the daily admission of needy 
foreigners to the right of suffrage: and of course 
to the power of commanding the earnings of 
of those, who have spent their lives in industry. 
The wealth of our country, is principally held 
by persons of this cast, it is not an inheritance 
of an unjust monopoly, by rank and power. 
The door to it is open to every man; and is 
easily reached by those, who are industrious 
and economical. But it is very hard, that the 
idler, the spendthrift, or the beggarly outlaw, 
should have the disposal, or the management, 
of the fruits of economy, and industry. 


113 


In a review of the internal relations of the 
various members of this great political commu- 
nity, nothing can appear more offensive to 
reason, than the incongruity of the principles, 
and practice of some of our southern planters. 
While secured at home from the evils of 
excessive democracy, by that cruel system 
which has placed the majority of their ignorant 
population in chains—they have been embol¬ 
dened elsewhere to countenance those principles 
—which have given to ignorance the mastery. 
Hence with perfect safety to themselves—they 
have been enabled to flatter the prejudices of 
the people, throughout the union, and by these 
means have gained an ascendency in the gene¬ 
ral government—which they would have shud¬ 
dered to acquire in this way—had the politicks 
which they have elsewhere sanctioned—been 
extended to their own labouring class. 

But when they look around them in the na¬ 
tional legislature, and behold the poverty of 
talent and information displayed by many of the 
representatives—when they consider in the 
aggregate, the representation of Pennsylvania, 
—or figure to themselves its government— 

9 . 


114 


and its governour; they may find reason to 
rejoice in the prospect of uncontrolled influ¬ 
ence—but must feel some conscientious regret 
when they reflect on the means—by which 
their sw ay has been established. 

Citizens of Pennsylvania !—by the incapa¬ 
city of your representation—your influence in 
the national government is annihilated. Your 
representatives ‘ appear not at the seat of go¬ 
vernment to instruct—but to receive instruc¬ 
tions. You have been incited to banish your 
wisest and best citizens from the councils of 
the nation—and of the state—^because they 
would not become subservient to the slave¬ 
holders of the south. It is true that they have 
not, like . some of these—flattered your 
prejudices—or encouraged your passions: but 
in adhering to a course so destructive of their 
influence—can they have any other than the 
most honourable motives? Are they rewarded 
with distinction, power, or emolument?—No; 
their only reward is conscious integrity;—the 
pleasing reflection, that however neglected by 
you, they have still preferred the welfare of 
their country—to the temptations of corrupt 
ambition. 


115 


This appeal is addressed to you by one— 
^vho is equally uninfluenced—by fear—or ex¬ 
pectation—who does not want—and could not 
receive official distinctions:—by one—whose 
taste—disposition—and pursuits—are incon¬ 
sistent with political life. At no time a bigot to 
any political sect;—but coolly surveying the 
opinions of each in their turn—he has ventured 
to think altogether for himself. Hence it is 
most probable that his sentiments will not be 
approved by zealots of any party;—but he is 
sure» that his motives, if known—would be 
respected by all. 


Joi! bfjo.'; j'hB'A- ton . a--. 

iigx, .: -^^laj, 

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OJ orni: jHi(I.:;,- 

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''.'J '/'iv' " ■ . ' ■ • '-..• ' .■ ' • ■' 




;")\*;'..'-'-a: i':^. a, ^_; , 

^ 4 -v ... ^ ■ ., .-»'■ 

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'Va'^v.^ a\‘ 




APPENDIX. f 


(NOTE A.) 

To John Hancock.^ ^-^9- President of Congress. 

« Cambridge, Feb. 9, 1776. 

“Sir, V ,, i 

“ The purport of , this letter will be directed to a 
single object., Throughj^you, I mean to lay it before 
congress; and—at , the same time that I beg their se¬ 
rious attention to the subject—to Rsk pardon for in¬ 
truding an opinion, not only unasked, but in some 
measure, repugnant to their resolves. 

“ The disadvantages attending the limited enlist¬ 
ment of troops are too apparent to those who are eye 
witnesses of them, to- render any animadversions ne¬ 
cessary: but to gentlemen at a distance, whose atten¬ 
tion is engrossed by a thousand imported objects, the 
case may be otherwise. 

“ That this cause precipitated the fate of the brave 
and much to be lamented general Montgomery, and 
brought on the defeat which followed thereupon, I 
have not the most distant’ doubt—for had he not been 
apprehensive of the troops leaving him at so impor¬ 
tant a crisis, but continued the blockade of Quebeck, 
a capitulation (from the best accounts I have been 
able to- collect) must inevitably have followed. And 
that we \yere not at one time obliged to dispute these 
\ ines under disadvantageous circumstances (pro- 



118 


cceding from the same cause, to wit: the militia dis¬ 
banding of themselves before the reenforcements 
could be got in) is to me a matter of Avonder and 
astonishment; and proves that general Howe Avas 
cither unacquainted Avith our situation, or restrained 
by his instructions from putting any thing to a hazard 
till his reenforcements should arrive. 

“ The instance of general Montgomery—(I men¬ 
tion it, because it is a striking one; for a number of 
others might be adduced)—proves, that, instead of 
having.men to take advantage of circumstances, you 
are, in a manner, compelled, right or Avrong, to make 
circumstances yield to a secondary consideration. 
Since the first of December,'H have been devising 
every means in my power to secure these encamp¬ 
ments; and, though I am sensible that Ave never have, 
since that period, been able to act upon the olfensiA^e, 
and, at times, not in a condition to defend;—yet the 
cost of marching home one set of men—bringing in 
another;-^the havock and Avaste occasioned by the 
first—the repairs necessary for the second: Avith a 
thousand incidental charges and inconveniences 
which have arisen, and which it is scarce possible 
either to recollect or describe—amount to near as 
much as the keeping up a respectable body of troops 
the Avhole time, ready for any emergency, would 
have done.—To this may be added, that you never 
can haA^e a well disciplined army. 

“ To bring men Avell acquainted Avith the duties of 
a soldier, requires time. To bring them under proper 
discipline and subordination, not only requires time, 
•but is a work of great difficulty, and, in this army, 
where there is so little distinction betAveen the 
officers and soldiers, requires an uncommon degree 


\ 


119 


of attention. To expect then the same service from 
raw and undisciplined recruits as from veteran sol¬ 
diers, is to expect what never did and perhaps never 
will happen. Men who are familiarized to danger meet 
it without shrinking; whereas those who have never 
seen service often apprehend danger where no dan¬ 
ger is. Three things prompt men to a regular dis¬ 
charge of their duty in time of action—natural 
bravery—hope of reward—and fear of punishment. 
The two first are common to the untutored and the 
disciplined soldier; but the latter most obviously dis¬ 
tinguishes the one from the other. A coward, when 
taught to believe, that if he breaks his ranks and 
abandons his colours, he will be punished with death 
by his own party—will take his chance against the 
enemy: but a man who thinks little of the one and is 
fearful of the other, acts from present feelings, re¬ 
gardless of consequences. 

‘‘ Again, men of a day’s standing will not look 
forward: and from experience we find, that, as the 
time approaches for their discharge; they grow 
careless of their arms, ammunition, camp utensils, 
&c. Nay even the barracks themselves have felt un¬ 
common marks of wanton depredation, and lay us 
under fresh trouble and additional expense in pro¬ 
viding for every fresh set, when w'e find it next to 
impossible to procure such articles as are absolutely 
necessary in the first instance. To this may be 
added the seasoning which new recruits must have 
to a camp and the loss consequent thereupon. But 
this is not all. Men, engaged for a short limited time 
only, haye the officers too much in their power: for, 
to obtain a degree of popularity in order to obtain a 
second enlistment, a kind of familiarity takes place. 


120 


wliich bi'iiigs on a relaxation of discipline, unlicensed 
furloughs, and other indulgences incompatible with 
order and good government; by which means, the lat¬ 
ter part of the time for which the soldier was en¬ 
gaged is spent in undoing what you were aiming to 
inculcate in the first. 

“ To go into an enumeration of the evils we have 
experienced in this late great change of the armv, and 
the expense incidental to it—to say nothing of the 
hazard we have run, between the discharging of one 
army and enlistment of another, unless an enormous 
expense of militia is incurred—would greatly exceed 
the bounds of a letter. What 1 have already taken the 
liberty of saying will serve to convey a general idea 
of the matter; and therefore I shall, with all due de¬ 
ference, take the freedom to give it as my opinion, 
that, if the congress have any reason to believe that 
there will be occasion for troops another year, and con¬ 
sequently of another enlistment, they would save mo¬ 
ney, and have infinitely better troops if they were, even 
at a bounty of twenty, thirty, or more dollars, to en¬ 
gage the men already enlisted (till January next) such 
others as may be wanted to complete the establish¬ 
ment, for and during the war. 

“ I will not undertake to say that the men can be 
had upon these terms: but I am satisfied that it will 
never do to let the matter alone as it was last year, 
till the time of service was near expiring. The ha¬ 
zard is too great in the first place:—^in the next, the 
trouble and perplexity of disbanding one army and 
raising another at the same instant, and in such a 
critical situation as the last was, is scarcely in the 
power of words to describe, and such as no man, 
who has experienced it once, will ever undergo 
again. * ** \ am, &c. GEO. WASHINGTON. 


121 


“ Col. Morrises on the Heights op Haerlem, 

« Sefitember 24, 1776. 

* * * ♦ To place any dependence upon militia is 
suredly resting on a broken staff, meii just dragged 
from the tender scenes of domestick life,—unaccus¬ 
tomed to the din of arms—^totally unacquainted with 
every kind of military skill; which being followed by 
a want of confidence in themselves, when opposed to 
troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed; 
supefioiir in knowledge and superiour in arms, makes 
them timid and ready to fly from their own shadows. 
Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living 
(particvilarly in the lodging) brings bh sickiiess in 
many, impatience in all, and suOh an unconquerable 
desire of returning to their respective homes, that it 
not only produces shameful and scandalous desertion^ 
among themselves, but infuses the like spirit into 
others. ^ 

« Again, men accustomed to unbounded freedom 
and no control, cannot brook the Pedtraiht which is 
indispensably necessary to the good order and govern¬ 
ment of an army;i without which, licentiousness 
and every kind of disorder triumphantly reigti^To 
bring men to a proper degree of subordination is not 
the work of a day, a month, or even a year; and, Un¬ 
happily for us and the cause we are engaged iii, the 
little discipline I have been labouring to establish in 
the army under my immediate command'is in a man¬ 
ner done away by having such amixthPO of troops as 
have been called together within these few months. 

“ Relaxed and unfit as our rules and Pegulations of 
war are for the government of an army^ the militia 
(those properly so called; for of these- we Mve two 

L 


122 


sprts, , the six months men, and those sent in as a 
temporary aid) do not think themselves subject to 
them, and therefore take liberties which the soldier 
is pimishpd for. This creates jealousy: jealousy be¬ 
gets dissatisfactions; and these by degrees, ripen into 
mutiny, keeping the whole army in a confused and 
diso-rdered state,—rendering the time of those who 
wish to see regularity and good order prevail, more 
unhappy than words can describe^ Besides this, such 
repeated, changes take place,that all arrangement is 
set at nought, ; and the constant -fluctuation of things 
deranges every plan as fast as adopted; ! 

. These, sir,,congress may be assured,'are but a 
small part of the inconveniences whieh might be enu¬ 
merated, and lattribiited to militia; but there is one 
that. merits , r particular attention, and that is the 
expense. Certain I am, that it would' be; cheaper 
to keep fifty or a hundred thousand in constant 
pay, than to depend upon half the number and sup¬ 
ply the other half occasionally by militia. The time 
the latter are in p^y before and after they are in camp, 
assembling and marching—the waste of ammunition, 
the consumption of stores, which, in spite of every 
resolution or requisition of congress, they must be 
furnished with, or sent home—added to other inci¬ 
dental expenses consequent upon their Coming and 
conduct in camp—surpasses all idea, and destroys 
every kind of regularity and economy which you could 
establish ampng fixed and settled troops, and will, in 
my opinion, p^’ove; (if the scheme is adhered to) the 
ruin of pur cause; 

“ Tlv?/jealousies of a standing army,, and the; evils 
to be appreh,ended from one, are remote, and, in my 
judgment, situated; and circumstanced as we are, not 


if^S 


at all to be dreaded: but the consequence of wanting 
one, according to 'my ideas, formed from'the present 
view'of things is certain and inevitable ruin. For; if I 
was called upon to declare upon oath, Svhether the 
militia have been most serviceable or hurtful upon the 
whole, I should subscribe to the latter. I do not mean 
by this, however, to arraign the conduct of congress, 
in so doing I should equally condemn my own mea¬ 
sures, if I did not my judgment: but experience, which 
is the best criterion to work by, so fully, clearly and 
decisively reprobates the practice of trusting to militia, 
that no man who regards order, regularity and econo¬ 
my, or who has any regard for his own honour, cha¬ 
racter, or peace of mind, will' risk them* upon this 
issue.' ■ ' 

“ An army formed of good officers moves like 
clock work: but there is no situation upon earth less 
enviable or more distressing than that person’s who 
is at the head of troops who are regardless of order 
and discipline, and who are unprovided with almost 
every necessary. In a word, the difficulties which have 
for ever surrounded me since I have been in the 
service, and kept my mind constantly upon the stretch 
—the wounds which my feelings (as an officer) have 
received by a thousand things which have happened 
contrary to my expectation and wishes * * added 
to a consciousness of my inability to govern an army 
composed of such discordant parts, and under such a 
variety of intricate and perplexing circumstances, in¬ 
duce not only a belief, but a thorough conviction in my 
mind that it will be impossible (unless there is a tho- 
rough change in our military system) for me to con¬ 
duct matters in such a manner as to give satisfaction 
to the publick, v/hich is all the'recompence I aim at^ 
or ever wished for. 


m 


i Before { conclude, I must SLpologise for the liber¬ 
ties taken fo this letter, and for the blots and scratch¬ 
es therein, pot having time to give it more correctly. 
With truth I. can add, that, with every sentiment of 
respect and esteem, I am yours and the congress’s 
mo^t obedient, &c. 

GEORGE WASHINGTON.” 


NOTE B. 

On the Origin and Use of Money. 

“ When the division of labour has been once 
thoiToughly established, it is but a very small pait 
of a man’s wants, which the produce of his own 
labour ca.n supply. He supplies the far greater part, 
of them by exchanging that surplus part of the 
produce of his own labour, which is over and above 
his own consumption, for such parts of the produce 
of other men’s labour as he has occasion for. Every 
man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in some 
measure a merchant, and the society itself grows tp 
be what is properly a commercial society. 

“ But when the division of labour first began to take 
place, this power of exchanging must frequently 
have been very much clogged and embarrassed in 
its operations. One man, we shall suppose, has more 
of a certain commodity than he himself has occasion 
for, while another has less. The former consequently 
would be glad to dispose of, and the latter to pur¬ 
chase, a part of this superfluity. But if this latter 
should chance to have nothing that the former stands 
in need of, no exchange can be made between them. 
The buteber has more meat in his shop than he 


125 


himself can consume, and the brewer and the baker 
would each of them be willing to purchase a parj: 
of it. But they have nothing to offer in exchange, 
except the different productions of their respective 
trades, and the butcher is already provided with all 
the bread and beer which he has immediate occasion 
for. No exchange can, in this case, be made be¬ 
tween them. He cannot be their merchant, nor they 
his customers; and they are all of them thus mutually 
less serviceable to one another. In order to avoid 
the inconveniency of such situations, every prudent 
man in every period of society, after the first 
establishment of the division of labour, must naturally 
have endeavoured to manage his affairs in such a 
manner, as to have at all times by him, besides the 
peculiar produce of his own industry; a certain 
quantity of some one commodity or other, such as he 
imagined few people would be likely to refuse in 
exchange for the produce of their industry. 

‘‘ Many different commodities, it is probable, were 
successively both thought of and employed for this 
purpose. In the rude ages of society, cattle are said 
to have been the common instrument of commerce; 
and, though they must have been a most inconvenient 
one, yet in old times we find things were frequently 
valued according to the number of cattle which had 
been given in exchange for them. The armour of 
Diomede, says Homer, cost only nine oxen; but that 
of Glaucus cost an hundred oxen. Salt is said to be 
the common instrument of commerce and exchanges 
in Abyssdnia; a species of shells in some parts of the 
coast of India; dried cod at Newfoundland; tobacco 
in Virginia; sugar in some of our West India colo¬ 
nies;-hides or dressed leather in some other coun- 


126 


tries': an^d there is ' at this day a village in Scotland 
where it is' not uncommon, I am told, for a workman 
to/carry hails instead of money to the baker’s shop 
or the ale house. ' " 

« In ail countries, however, men seem at last to 
have been determined by irresistible reasons to give 
the preference, for this emj loyment, to metals above 
every other commodity. Metals can not only be kept 
with as little loss as any other commodity, scarce 
any thing being less perishable than they are, but 
they can''•likewise, without any loss, be divided into 
any number of parts, as by fusion those parts can 
easily be re-united again; a quality which no other 
equally durable commodities possess, and which 
more than any other quality renders them fit to be 
the instruments of commerce and circulation. The 
man who wanted to buy salt, for example, and had 
nothing but cattle'to give in exchange for it, must 
have been obliged to buy salt to the value of a whole 
ox, or a whole sheep, at a time. He could seldom 
buy less' than this, because what he was to give for 
it could sfeldom be divided without loss; and if he had 
a mind to biiy ’more, he must, for the same reasons, 
have been obliged to buy double or triple the quan¬ 
tity,'the value, to wit, of two or three oxen, or of two 
or'three sheep. Tf,' on the contrary, instead of sheep 
or bxch, he had metals to give in exchange for it, 
he could easily proportion the quantity of the metal 
to the precise quantity of the commodity which he 
had iniinediate occasion for. 

“ Different metals have been made use of by dif¬ 
ferent nations for this purpose. Iron was the common 
instrument of commerce among the ancient Spartans; 
copper among the ancient Romans; and gold and sil¬ 
ver among all rich and commercial nations.” 


127 


' ■ ' note‘c.* ■' 

. < • ;ji! *■ I: ' - . i: : I'J 111; , ■ 

‘‘Commercial .capital, let it then .bctlimdcrstoodj 
consists'not in paper, and is not augmented^hy the 
multiplication of this medium < of; paymentr ln one 
sense, indeed, it may be’increased<by paip'er. I mean, 
that the 'nominal value of the Existing goods maybe 
enlarged through a reduction which is daused by pa¬ 
per) in the value of that standard by which all proper¬ 
ty isiestimated. The paper itself forms.no part of the 
estimate. : > .1 • ■; 

“ This mode of computing the amount of the nation¬ 
al capital engaged in comiherce, is substantially the 
same with that in which each commercial man es¬ 
timates the value of his own property. Paper consti¬ 
tutes, it is true, an article on the credit side of the 
books of some men; but it forms an exactly equal 
item on the debit side of the books of others. It con¬ 
stitutes, therefore, on the whole neither a debit'nor 
a credit. The banker who issues twenty thousand 
pounds in notes, and lends in consequence twenty 
thousand pounds to the merchants on the' security of 
bilis accepted by them, states himself in his books to 
be debtor to the various holders of his notes to the 
extent of tlie sum in question; and ^ states himself 
to be the creditor of the acceptors of the bills in his 
possession to the same amount. His valuation, there¬ 
fore, of his own property, is the same as if neither 
the bills nor the bank notes had any existence. Again: 
the merchants, in making their estimate of property,, 
deduct the bills payable by themselves which are in 
the drawer of the banker, and add, to their estimate 
the notes of the banker which are in dieir own draw¬ 
er; so that the valuation, likewise, of the capital of 
the merchants is the same as if the paper had no ex- 

n . . -1 . , af a) it:'! 


128 


istcnce. The •use of paper does not, therefore, intro¬ 
duce any principle of delusion into that estimate of 
property which is made by individuals. The case of 
gold, on the other hand, differs from that of paper 
inasmuch as the possessor of gold takes credit for 
that for which no man debits himself. The several 
coramert^ial capitals of traders, as estimated in their 
books, would, unquestionably, be found, if deducted 
from their other property, and added together, to cor¬ 
respond, in amount with a general estimate of the 
commercial stock of the country, calculated under 
the several heads already stated. - 

“ It is true, that menj in estimating their share in 
the publick funds of the country, add to their esti¬ 
mate a debt due to them which no individual deducts 
from his valuation. On this head, it may be observed, 
that the nation is the debtor. But the commercial 
capital, which has been described, exists indepen¬ 
dently of capital in the publick funds. The man in 
trade has property in trade. If he has property in 
the stocks, he has the property in trade in addition 
tp it. In speaking, therefore, of the commercial 
capital, whether ofttiei nation or of an individuai, the 
idea that any part of it is composed cither of the pa¬ 
per credit or of the stocks of the country, is to be to¬ 
tally excluded.” v. Thorntords Inquiry^ ft. 7. 

NOTE D. 

I have deemed it improper to detain the reader 
with a practical exposition of the multifaripus facili¬ 
ties, and conveniences, afforded to the mercantile 
world by credit. To the trading part of the community 
such an exposition would be tedious, and to others 
useless, if they neglect facts with which a very little 
inquiry would render them familiar. 


129 " 


NOTE E. 

Commercial morality will never prevail, unless 
where the state of law, or trade, or customs of soci- • 
ety, render it the best' policy of men to be honest. 
A favourable concurrence of such incentives to 
honesty, is productive of a species of worldly virtue, 
which has many* of the practical good effects of ge¬ 
nuine integrity. It is from this cause, that many 
'traders will act honourably at home, and yet disho¬ 
nourably with foreigners; and hence nations are led 
to accuse each other reciprocally of preeminence in 
knavery. They are mutually better acquainted with 
the cheats which they suffer from foreign knaves, 
than those -which foreigners suffer from their own. 

In no country more than in Great Britain, does the 
state of law or trade, or customs of society, tend to the 
support of punctuality in commercial dealings. The 
fraudulent trader there, not only loses the advantage of 
credit-—but is severely handled by the law; and the 
commerce of the country not being over-proportioned 
to its capital, there is no very powerful temptation to 
those overtrading speculations, which when unfortu¬ 
nate, are productive of the greatest trials to wdiich 
integrity can be subjected. In this country on the 
other hand, neither the laws, nor the customs of 
society, are so severe upon mercantile fraud; while 
the temptation to overtrade has been very great, ow¬ 
ing to the incompetency of our capital to the com¬ 
mercial field, opened by the advantages of neutrality. 

From these causes, insolvency has been more fre¬ 
quent in this country than in Great Britain, and 
hence impressions have been created in the minds of 
some prejudiced foreigners, unfavourable to the 

s 


130 


morality of the people of these states. Yet in con-* 
sequence of the facility 'vvith which the poorer 
classes earn their livelihood, there is no country 
where theft or robbeiy are more rare; or where so 
few' are supported by those petty fraudulent practices^ 
which infest the cities of Europe. Our convicts are 
principally foreigners, or runaway slaves. Many of 
our people retire to repose wdth their doors unbolted. 
It is very rare for the most lonely and helpless tra¬ 
veller, to suffer the slightest molestation, and more 
especially from natives. How^ever frequent may be in¬ 
solvency, the highest mercantile confidence pervades a 
very large portion of our community. Tradesmen ge- 
nerally allow their customers twelve months credit, and 
thousands diurnally pass from hand to hand on our ex¬ 
changes, without other security than a w'ord of honour. 
The creditor has often been aw'are of his risk in trust¬ 
ing, and his price has been proportionate; and in de- 
spight of a very relaxed system of law in relation to 
debtors, the consequent exactions of the idle and 
dishonest, bear but a very small proportion to the 
advantages derived from mercantile credit. Insinua¬ 
tions of any radical disparity of moral sentiment in 
he people of these states w’hen compared wdth the 
British, are how'cver best answered by the experi¬ 
ment to which they gave rise. The English mer¬ 
chants and manufacturers, diffident of the integrity 
of the American traders, adopted the expedient 
of sending out men of distinguished rectitude to act 
for them as agents in America. But alas I English 
morality released fronr the w'orldly restraints to 
which it had been subjected at home, soon adapted 
Itself to the immunities, and temptations of the coun¬ 
try, to which it "was transferred. It is notorious, that 


131 


of these agents, a majority of those who have en¬ 
gaged in the carrying trade, have failed; and that 
their English employers, or connexions, in many in- ^ 
stances, have been injured or ruined by them. 

In England, the commercial advantages derived 
from credit both at home and abroad are so great, 
that the interest of the mercantile class is indissolu¬ 
bly connected with morality in trade. London is the 
bank of the commercial world; and all the profits de¬ 
rived by her in that capacity, depend much on the 
rigid observance of honesty in her bankers, or mer¬ 
chants. 

The influence of this necessity of honest conduct, 
arising from the nature of banking operations, has 
been fully shown in this country; where the banks 
have, with a few exceptions, been preeminent for 
their stability and rectitude. 

It may be observed, that the more moral tendency' 
of the customs of society in England, is a proof of a 
superiour morality of sentiment. But this inference 
cannot be drawn from the customs to which I allude; 
which are those by which the innocent, as well as 
the guilty debtor, are subjected so much more to the 
power of the creditor, and by which the latter is 
countenanced in the exercise of a degree of rigour, 
which in this country is unknown. In our system 
there is more of the morality of the heart. In that of 
England, more of legal morality, or of strict adhe¬ 
rence to the principles, which are favourable to the 
the general and permanent welfare of society. 


132 


In comparing the circulation of bills with that of 
bank notes, Mr. Thornton appears to consider the 
retention of the former as a matter of choice, w'here- 
as I imagine it is much more often the effect of ne¬ 
cessity. In this, country it rarely happens, that the 
holder of a bill or note, payable at any future time, 
will not, ill order to exchange it for specie, or bank 
notes, or bank credit, readily lose the discount. 

“ Bills,’* he observes, “ and especially those, which 
are drawn for large sums, may be considered as in 
general circulating more slowly than either gold 'or 
bank notes, and for a reason which it is material to 
explain. Bank notes, though they yield an interest to 
the issuer, afford none to the man who detains them 
in his possession; they are to him as unproductive 
as guineas. The possessor of a banknote, therefore, 
makes haste to part with it. The possessor of a bill 
of exchange possesses, on the contrary, that which 
is always growing more valuable. The bill, when it 
is first drawn, is worth something less than a bank 
note, on account of its not being due until a distant 
day; and the first receiver of it may be supposed to 
obtain a compensation for the inferiority of its i value 
in’ the price of the article with which the bill is 
purchased. When he parts with it, he may'be con¬ 
sidered as granting to the next receiver a like com¬ 
pensation, which is proportionate to the time which 
the bill has still to run. Each holder of a bill has^ 
therefore, an interest in detaining it.” 

Thornton^s Inquiry^ fi. 33. 


Does not this depend on contingencies ? If the 
holder cannot gain as much by the employment 
of the value of the bill, as the amount of the dis¬ 
count, it is his interest to keep it; but as the profits 
of trade are always above the rate of interest, it is 
generally advantageous to the traders to pay the 
discount, rather than to keep the bill. 


NOTE G. 

So great is the preference given to bank credi in 
this country, when compared with specie, that in 
the hands even of the most ignorant and timid, con¬ 
siderable sums are very rarely kept. The strong box 
or the hole of the miser, is now no longer heard of. 
Our modern misers consider the coffers of the bank, 
as affording the highest degree of security. 

The bank of the United States alone, I have been 
well informed, has had at one period in its various 
offices, FOURTEEN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS in gold and 
silver, for which there was no possible use; expor- 
t^ition being at the time suspended by the embargo. 





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